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This thesis proposes that radical actors interact with the political center in several distinct 
modes: reactive, cooperative, and confrontational. In the reactive mode, they respond to 
undesired changes imposed by the political center i.e., to shifts in policy which threaten their 
existing position. In the cooperative mode, they tacitly ally with more mainstream actors in 
advancing a shared policy agenda. In the confrontational mode, they attempt to change an 
undesired policy by coercion. This thesis proceeds to a series of case studies, drawn primarily 
from American political history, which illustrate each of these modes. The first chapter addresses 
the reactive mode, showing that while radical actors are sometimes assumed to oppose the status 
quo, they may in fact be defending the status quo. It also proposes ways in which “reactive 
radicalism” may be mitigated, by incorporating stakeholders into the policy process. The second 
chapter studies cooperation, finding that mainstream political actors will collaborate with 
radicals when they face deeply entrenched opposition from the political center, making the 
potential advantages of such an alliance outweigh the risks. The third chapter focuses 
confrontation, and the circumstances under which radical actors can succeed. The key findings 
are that radicals thrive when the political center is divided and unable to effectively suppress 
them, and that they are most likely to succeed when they enjoy elite patronage and pursue 
narrowly defined goals. The final surveys the contemporary American political scene and asks 
what form radicalism is likely to take in the near future, concluding that divisions at the political 
center will likely contribute to an intensification of radical activity. 






 I am extremely grateful to Doctors Hill, Strauss, and Paschall for the invaluable 
mentorship and assistance they have provided throughout this project. Without them, my 
sometimes inchoate ideas would likely never have been assembled into a coherent product, and 
this project would never have reached fruition. I would also like to thank my wife, without 












Abstract                                                                                                                                          ii 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                                       iii 
Introduction: Defining the Radical and the Center                                                                    6                                                                                                                 
Reaction: When Radicals Resist Change From the Center               1 
 The Populist Conception of the Environment                                                                    11                                                    
 Historical Antecedents: Land-Use Populism in the English Tradition                              16                                                                                                              
 Historical Antecedents: The Sagebrush Rebellion                                                            20                                                                                                 
Case Studies: Modern Environmental Policy Conflicts                                                     23                  
Case Study: West Virginia                                                                                                 24 
Case Study: Successors to the Sagebrush Rebellion                                                          29 
Conclusion                                                                                                                         37 
Cooperation: When Radicals Work With Mainstream Actors                                               39                           
 Introduction                                                                                                                        39                        
Literature Review                                                                                                               40 





Social Roots of American Environmentalism                                                                    49 
Legal Roots of American Environmentalism                                                                    53 
The Civil Rights Movement                                                                                               58 
Black Power in the Cold War                                                                                            62 
Conclusion                                                                                                                         65 
Confrontation: When Radicals Succeed                                                                                 69 
A History of Violence                                                                                                        70 
Theories of Unrest and Upheaval                                                                                      72 
Structural Demographic Theory and the American Civil War                                          75 
Radical Violence in the Civil War Era                                                                              77 
The Black Patch War                                                                                                         82 
Rage in the Midwest                                                                                                          89 
Conclusion                                                                                                                         96 
Conclusion: Radical Actors in Contemporary American Politics                                           99   
 Intensification of Elite Competition                                                                                 100 
Popular Immiseration and Reactive Radicalism                                                              104 
Bibliography                                                                                                                               111 




Introduction: Defining the Radical and the Center 
“Radicals”, “extremists”, “fringe” and other such terms have lately begun to permeate 
political and academic discourse. In political discourse, they are almost invariably used as a 
smear, an attempt to push a political actor or position beyond the boundaries of respectable 
opinion –references to Representative Ocasio-Cortez as a “radical socialist”1, for example. More 
thoughtful considerations shows the difficulty of defining “radicals” and “extremists” in 
anything but a relative sense. The “fringe” and the “center” or “mainstream” can only be 
understood by comparison to each other. Their positions can shift over time and vary from one 
society to the next. History is full of radical groups whose ideas became the norm years or 
generations later. Freedom of religion, largely taken for granted in the United States today, was 
championed by the Levellers in the English Civil War more than a century before the Bill of 
Rights was drafted.2 At the time, the Levellers were a fringe within a fringe, with even 
revolutionary Puritans regarding their ideas as extreme.3 Today of course, such ideas are 
commonplace. Similar processes could be described for the abolition of slavery4 or the gradual 
extension of voting rights to ever-greater segments of the population.5 
Before going further, it is useful to define terms clearly. For purposes of this thesis, 
“radical actors” are those who operate outside of commonly-accepted channels in pursuit of 
policy changes. There is no hard-and-fast line which separates radical actors from more 
                                                          
1 “Marjorie Taylor Greene Accused of ‘Verbal Assault’ on Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez,” BBC News, May 13, 2021, sec. 
US & Canada, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57109040. 
2 Michael Curtis, “IN PURSUIT of LIBERTY: THE LEVELLERS and the AMERICAN BILL of RIGHTS” (, 1991), 
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/166045/08_02_Curtis.pdf. 
3 Ibid 
4 Adam Rothman, “Review: ‘the Slave’s Cause: A History of Abolition’ by Manisha Sinha,” The Atlantic (The Atlantic, 
March 14, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-truth-about-abolition/471483/. 
5 National Geographic Society, “Voting Rights throughout United States History,” National Geographic Society, July 




mainstream actors; radicalism is a spectrum. By way of illustration: a letter writing campaign 
protesting a proposed housing development is less radical than a protest in which activists chain 
themselves to trees in an effort to prevent development. Such a protest in turn is less radical than 
a campaign of sabotage against industrial equipment, which would itself be less radical than 
violent attacks on equipment operators. An attempt has been made to employ consistent 
terminology throughout, but where terms like “extremists” or “fringe” occur, these should be 
read as synonyms for “radical.” 
“The Center”, by contrast is the proverbial “center of power” those institutional and 
societal actors who are best positioned to influence state policy through societally-accepted 
channels. This is the group C. Wright Mills described as the “Power Elite”6. The exact margins 
of the political center are hard to pin down. As with “radicalism”, political actors may be thought 
of along a spectrum of distance-from-the-center. In the United States, no one person has absolute 
and final political authority, but most would agree that a Senator is closer to the political center 
than a small-town mayor, who is in turn closer to the center than a member of some 
disenfranchised minority. Factors which shape the margins of the political center include 
governmental structure and organization, class, social mobility, and the nature and degree of 
popular political participation.  
In understanding the political center, it is useful to draw on the concept of the metropole. 
The term originally referred to the homeland of the various European colonial empires, but it can 
also be used to describe the relationship between more and less influential elements of society. In 
Canadian history, by way of illustration, the metropolitan model thesis has been used to explain 
                                                          




the politics and history of Northwestern Ontario.7 Northwestern Ontario is characterized as 
regional hinterland, a word which itself implies subordination to an external capital.8 The 
Northwestern Ontario region’s relationship with the more developed urban regions is 
characterized by economic and political dependency, with local markets being heavily dependent 
on tourism.9  The lack of economic opportunities results in a youth population exodus, further 
diminishing the region’s growth potential.10 The local industries which do exist are largely 
managed by experts from outside the region, intensifying the locals sense of alienation.11 
Infrastructure investment12 and service provision13 are minimal. 
In short, Northwest Ontario’s relationship with the rest of the country is characterized by 
“extraction”, “frustration”, and “parochialism”.14 The region hosts an abundance of radical 
political groups, ranging from various left-wing actors15 to separatists16 to ecological groups 
concerned with the possible effects of large-scale water-diversion projects.17 Although this 
example is drawn from another time and place than the case studies this paper is concerned with, 
                                                          
7 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. 
8 Ibid, pg 731 
9 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. 
10 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. Page 736 
11 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. Page 737 
12 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. Page 738 
13 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. Page 744 -745 
14 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. Page 730 
15 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. Page 747 
16 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 
no. 4 (December 1977): 727–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050873. Page 748 
17 G. R. Weller, “Hinterland Politics: The Case of Northwestern Ontario,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 




many of examples continue to apply. A perceived lack of representation and heavy-handedness 
on the part of the local or national metropole is a major factor in several of the case studies 
examined in this thesis: the Malheur occupation, the politics of West Virginia, the Black Patch 
Tobacco war, the “war within a war” in East Tennessee, and the militia movement of the 1990s 
are all driven by the same factors that describe the unique political character of Northwest 
Ontario. Asymmetrical power distributions between distinct interest groups in highly centralized 
polities seem, in short, to be recipes for discontent. 
The actions of the center are constrained, and occasionally impelled, by the so-called  
Overton Window.18 The Overton window refers simply to the range of “acceptable opinions” in 
political discourse. For example, around a quarter of a century ago, gay marriage was supported 
by only a small minority.19 At the time, a politician advocating full acceptance of gay marriage 
would thus have been on the edge of the Overton window of acceptable opinion. Today, gay 
marriage is fully supported by the majority of the population20, and a politician who endorses it 
is unlikely to face significant pushback unless he represents an especially hard-right 
constituency.  
A ruling class whose policies push too hard against the limits of what society-at-large 
will accept is likely to embarrass itself, as shown by the failures of prohibition in both the United 
States21 and the former USSR.22 At the same time, however, the actions of the political center 
                                                          
18 “The Overton Window,” @MackinacCenter, 2010, https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow. 
1919 Inc Gallup, “Gay and Lesbian Rights,” Gallup.com, May 29, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-
lesbian-rights.aspx. 
20 Inc Gallup, “Gay and Lesbian Rights,” Gallup.com, May 29, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-
rights.aspx. 
21 Mark Thornton, “Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure,” Cato Institute, April 12, 2019, https://www.cato.org/policy-
analysis/alcohol-prohibition-was-failure. 





can shift societal norms. A ruling class which patronizes certain societal groups or ideologies at 
the expense of others can nudge social norms in one direction or another. The role of political 
and economic elites in attempting to shape public opinion is well-attested.23 Equally important is 
the question of norms within the center of power. Gorbachev’s calls for perestroika and glasnot, 
for instance, represented a radical departure from the previously established norms of the Soviet 
ruling class.24 Its full repercussions are hotly debated, but no one denies that they were of world-
historic importance.    
 In casual use, terms like “radical” and “center” imply an oppositional relationship. But 
the interactions between the two are more complex than that. This thesis argues that there are 
several distinct modes of interaction between the two. The first is oppositional. This is the 
presumptive standard when the center/radical dichotomy is deployed. In this model, the radical 
actor is typically considered confrontational. The Weather Underground in the United States25, 
the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland (prior to the Good Friday agreement)26, the 
Ba’ath party in pre-revolutionary Iraq27 are examples of confrontational radical groups who 
sought to overthrow the center (i.e., the established political order) by armed force.  
 This, however, is only one of the interactive modes that can exist between the extreme 
and the center. The second mode is reactive. Extremist groups do not spring into existence ex 
nihilo. Nor are they eternal and unchanging. More commonly, they emerge in response to shifts 
                                                          
23 Edward S Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent : The Political Economy of the Mass Media 
(London: The Bodley Head, 1988). 
24 Avraham Shama, Perestroika : A Comparative Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1992). 
25 Arthur M Eckstein, “How the Weather Underground Failed at Revolution and Still Changed the World,” Time 
(Time, November 2, 2016), https://time.com/4549409/the-weather-underground-bad-moon-rising/. 
26 James B Steinberg, “The Good Friday Agreement: Ending War and Ending Conflict in Northern Ireland - Texas 
National Security Review,” Texas National Security Review, July 17, 2019, https://tnsr.org/2019/05/the-good-
friday-agreement-ending-war-and-ending-conflict-in-northern-ireland/. 





within the center, i.e., to shifts within the established political order. This is noteworthy because 
the casual usage of “radical” often implies opposition to the status quo. In fact, as the first 
chapter will make clear, it possible for radical actors to defend the status quo, responding to the 
perceived erosion of traditional rights and privileges. The occupation of the Malheur wildlife 
refuge by disgruntled ranchers, frustrated with shifts in Federal land use regulations is an 
example of a reactive group.28 The popular unrest in England associated with ever-increasing 
restrictions on land use, stretching back centuries, is another such example.29  
 The last mode of interaction is cooperative. This mode occurs when political actors at or 
near the center tacitly or explicitly share some goals with more extreme groups. A classic 
example would be the case of mainstream anti-war protestors and more violent groups in the 
Vietnam war era, or between mainstream civil rights organizations and groups like the Black 
Liberation army.30 Another example might the group Hezbollah, which operates as both a 
paramilitary organization and a public political party, and maintains a (dubious) distinction 
between the two wings.31  
 These modes of interaction are neither static nor mutually exclusive. The Weather 
Underground, for example, had a tacitly cooperative relationship with more “mainstream” anti-
war groups that operated closer to the center, while it had a confrontational relationship with 
more hawkish political actors. It is also possible for the actors’ relationships to change over time. 
                                                          
28 By Jim Carlton in Burns Dallas Ore , and Dan Frosch in, “Roots of Oregon Land Dispute Stretch Back Decades,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2016, sec. US, https://www.wsj.com/articles/roots-of-oregon-land-dispute-stretch-
back-decades-1452042408. 
29 Manning, Roger B. "Patterns of Violence in Early Tudor Enclosure Riots." Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with 
British Studies 6, no. 2 (1974): 120-33. Accessed June 26, 2021. doi:10.2307/4048139. 
30 ICSR Team, “The Black Liberation Army and Homegrown Terrorism in 1970s America,” ICSR, April 12, 2012, 
https://icsr.info/2012/04/12/the-black-liberation-army-and-homegrown-terrorism-in-1970s-america/. 






The Weather Underground was largely composed of splinter elements from the more mainstream 
Students for a Democratic Society,32 and after an initial period of aggressively confrontational 
activity – bombings of federal buildings et cetera – it gradually dissolved and its members 
largely re-integrated themselves into more mainstream forms of political activity.33 
 This thesis deepens the prevailing model of radical-center interactions by differentiating 
between confrontational, reactive, and cooperative modes, and by discussing the factors which 
may cause sociopolitical actors to move between different modes. Although the focus is 
primarily on actors in an American context, the findings may be widely applicable. The first 
chapter discusses reactive dynamics. It shows how socio-politically marginal actors can respond 
to shifts at the center of power, becoming radical while essentially remaining in place as changes 
in centrally-directed policies and norms catch them unawares. It also discusses the ways in which 
these reactive dynamics can be softened and the conceptual gulf between those at the center of 
power and those at the margins reduced. By carefully managing this conceptual gulf, political 
actors can significantly reduce the frictions that inevitably come with social, economic, and 
political adjustments, maintaining the legitimacy of the established sociopolitical order. 
The second chapter focuses on two major political movements which developed in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s: the Civil Rights movement and the Environmental 
movement. Both of these movements also produced more militant offshoots in the form of 
groups like the Black Panther Party and Earth First! However, the militant elements of the Civil 
rights movement were far larger and more prominent than their eco-militant counterparts. This 
                                                          
32 Amanda Miller, “SDS Chapters 1962-1969 - Mapping American Social Movements,” depts.washington.edu, n.d., 
https://depts.washington.edu/moves/sds_map.shtml. 
33 Arthur M Eckstein, “How the Weather Underground Failed at Revolution and Still Changed the World,” Time 




chapter provides an explanation for why a relatively small faction of the Environmental 
movement was drawn to militancy compared to the Civil Rights movement. The key contention 
is that mainstream actors are likely to ally with radical actors when the mainstream group faces 
significant and deeply entrenched opposition from other groups equally close to the center of 
power. In the absence of such opposition, a mainstream group has little to gain from such an 
alliance, but when that opposition is present, mainstream actors may find advantage in such an 
alliance.  
 The last chapter discusses confrontational dynamics. Three cases studies of violent 
radical actors are examined: paramilitary groups in the American civil war, the so-called “Night 
Riders” in the Black Patch region of rural Kentucky, and the American militia movement that 
captured headlines in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These radical groups are united by their use 
of violence in pursuit of their goals; they are separated by the circumstances of their birth and  
range of outcomes their violent tactics actually achieved. The key findings are two-fold. First, a 
weak and divided political center, of the sort which preceded the Civil War, is effectively an 
invitation for radical actors to emerge, often in cooperation with political elites operating at or 
nearer the center than their ostensible allies. Second, radical actors which are successful tend to 
enjoy both elite patronage and to pursue narrowly-defined goals, rather than a grand 
revolutionary vision.   
 The conclusion examines the range of interactions prevailing in the American political 
sphere today. In particular, it asks whether we are approaching a situation where prevailing 
political institutions are experiencing a legitimation crisis of the sort which preceded the Civil 
War, and whether we can expect to see an increased frequency of confrontational groups 




environment with that preceding the Civil War indicates that the center is indeed weak and 
divided, precisely the circumstances under which radical actors are likely to thrive. Additionally, 
the high degree of centralization in the prevailing political structure increase the potential for 
reactive radicalism, as discussed in the first chapter. The thesis concludes by making 


















Reaction: When Radicals Resist Change From the Center  
The introduction discussed the concept of reactive radicalism. Reactive radicals, rather 
than seeking to overthrow the status quo, seek to preserve the existing status quo in the face of 
changes being imposed by the political center. Highly centralized polities are, by virtue of their 
centralization, more prone to give rise to such radical actors. This chapter will examine the 
populist backlash against modern environmental policies as one such instance of this larger 
phenomena. Because these case studies are largely taken from recent American history, the 
reactionary actors examined are mostly operating in a right-wing context. But the pattern itself is 
neither left nor right. Indeed, it predates the formulation of the left-right political spectrum. Nor 
is it confined strictly to environmental issues. Rather, environmental policy is a subset of larger 
debates about control and use of resources, a frequent source of contention in any state. Viewed 
in this light, the populist backlash to the “environmental management state”34 is simply a specific 
manifestation of reactive radicalism, as this chapter will demonstrate. 
The modern conception of environmentalism is a relatively recent development, largely 
emerging in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in response to the industrial 
revolution.35 Nonetheless, conflicts over what we would now call “environmental issues” have 
been a feature of human civilization for millennia, and probably predate recorded history. 
Disputes over grazing-land rights appear in the Book of Genesis.36 Similar conflicts between 
nomadic pastoralists persist into the twentieth century, at times escalating to armed violence.37 
                                                          
34 Staerklé, Christian and Eva G.T Green. “Right-wing Populism as a Social Representation: A Comparison Across 
Four European Countries. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 28 (6) (2018): 430-45 
doi:10.1002/casp.2369. 
35Spears, Rethinking the American Environmental Movement Post-1945, 81. 
36Gen  13: 5-9 
37Krieger, Panke, and Pregernig. Environmental Conflicts, Migration, and Governance (Kindle Edition). Chicago. 




Likewise, conflict over non-renewable strategic resources are a significant factor in international 
geopolitics.38 What is today called environmental policy often centers around questions of who 
will be permitted to make use of natural resources, and in what way they will be permitted to do 
so.39 Given the intensity with which such conflicts have been waged in the past and are 
sometimes waged in the present, and given the increasing stress placed upon the global 
ecosystem40, we are likely to see increasing tensions over environmental answers, both within 
and between states.   
The Populist Conception of the Environment 
For those involved, land-use conflicts revolve around questions of self-determination, 
territorial sovereignty, and economics. There are several key themes within the populist 
environmental framework, some of which actually predate the modern left-right political divide 
by centuries. Their age notwithstanding, these components form a more-or-less cohesive lens 
through which the populist views environmental politics.   
The first theme is probably best termed anti-globalism. Anti-globalism is a less dramatic 
term for what Benjamin Barber called “jihad”, an attempt to preserve “a world that existed prior 
to cosmopolitan capitalism…defined by traditions and historical torpor.”41 In this respect, they 
have much in common with the 19th-century romantics who helped give modern 
environmentalism its shape.42 These romantics resented the rise of industrial capitalism and the 
                                                          
38Krieger, Panke, and Pregernig. Environmental Conflicts, Migration, and Governance, Location 1165. 
39 Kennedy, Amanda, Environmental Justice and Land Use Conflict: The Governance of Mineral and Gas Resource 
Development. First edition. London: Taylor and Francis, 2017. Page 16 
40 Letters, “Facts about Our Ecological Crisis Are Incontrovertible. We Must Take Action | Letters,” the Guardian 
(The Guardian, October 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/26/facts-about-our-
ecological-crisis-are-incontrovertible-we-must-take-action. 
41Barber, Benjamin R., Jihad Vs. Mcworld. New York: Times Books, 1995. Page 157 
42Pepper, David., John W Perkins, and Martyn J Youngs. The Roots of Modern Environmentalism. London: Croom 




urban bourgeoisie, which undermined the status and lifestyle of the landed aristocracy.43 For 
them, the city and its denizens symbolized the ugliness of modernity.44 The romantics responded 
by a turn towards the past; it was in this period that European intellectuals began the glorification 
of “folk” culture and art.45 
In contemporary discourse, the populist has adopted many of the same beliefs that the 
nineteenth-century romantics had about the negative effects of capitalism. The German National 
Democratic Party (considered a successor to the Nazi party46) platform has 15 articles; 4 of them 
address the negative effectives of global capitalism specifically.47 The NPD, along with other 
far-right groups, has also been active in protests against the G8 summit48 and against attempts to 
reduce the German welfare state, territory traditionally occupied by the left.49 To be sure, anti-
globalization need not be explicitly environmental; it can just as easily be framed in terms of 
human welfare.50 In the case of the populist, the critique of global capitalism tends to focus on 
the disruption of traditional society and culture by external actors.51 In this, the populist shares 
common ground with many “green” movements that have adopted ambivalent or outright hostile 
attitudes towards global capitalism.52 
                                                          
43Pepper, David., John W Perkins, and Martyn J Youngs. The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 76 
Pepper, David., John W Perkins, and Martyn J Youngs. The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 84 
45Pepper, David., John W Perkins, and Martyn J Youngs. The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, 79 
46Sommer, Bernd. “Anti-Capitalism in the Name of Ethno-Nationalism: Ideological Shifts on the German Extreme 
Right.” Patterns of Prejudice 42 (3)(2008): 305-316 doi:10.1080/00313220802204046. Page 308 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 306. 
49 Ibid. 309. 
50 Buttel, Frederick H. “Some Observations on the Anti-Globalization Movement.” Australian Journal of Social 
Issues (Australian Council of Social Services) 38 (1)(2003): 95-116 doi:10.1002/j.1839-4655.2003.tb01138.x. Page 
108 
51Barber, Benjamin R., Jihad Vs. Mcworld. New York: Times Books, 1995. Page 78 




The second, and closely related, key theme is that of local sovereignty. The populist 
conception of community is a fundamentally territorial one,53 in which the land and the people 
are, if not one, at least intimately connected. In Great Britain, the phrase “England’s green and 
pleasant land” has become, in the usage of far-right actors, a kind of shorthand for a particular 
conception of British national identity.54 The rhetoric of blood and soil is an extreme formulation 
of this concept, but the idea of a “civilizational” connection between a people and a geographic 
region remains a powerful idea in populist political discourse.55 Meaningful sovereignty requires 
a degree of self-determination within a given geographic region,56 and populist rhetoric places 
great emphasis on “taking back” this self-determination from nebulously-defined hostile forces.57 
These hostile forces are generally imagined as a “corrupt elite.”58 Opposing authority 
figures and structures—whatever their origin—are depicted as fundamentally other and 
illegitimate. It is important to note that this people vs other discourse need not be framed in 
nationalistic terms.59 The alleged tyrannizing “other” may be a supra-national ruling body, or it 
may be a group within the nation-state itself.60 The other is often vaguely defined only as “the 
establishment”, existing in opposition to “the people.”61 In turn, the fate of the land should be in 
                                                          
53Benjamin De Cleen “Populism and Nationalism” Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa 
Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
54Emily Turner-Graham, “Protecting Our Green and Pleasant Land: UKIP, the BNP, and a history of Green Ideology 
on Britain’s Far Right.” in The Far Right and the Environment: Politics, Discourse and Communication edited by 
Forchtner and Bernhard. 58. Milton: Routledge, 2019.  
55 Kaya, Ayhan. Populism and Heritage In Europe: Lost In Diversity and Unity. Milton: Routledge, 2019. Page 64-
66 
56 Stilz, Anna, Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019. Page 2 
57Posner, Eric. “Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash”. Arizona State Law Journal 49 (June 2017): 
795-819 http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=133802313&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
Page 796 
58Fernández-García Belen, and Luengo. “Populist Parties in Western Europe”, 59 
59Rovira Kaltwasser, et al. The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 3 
60Fernández-García Belen, and Luengo. “Populist Parties in Western Europe”, 61 




the hands of its residents and “rightful owners”.62 Any ambiguity about who constitutes a 
“rightful owner” is glossed over.63   
A closely related aspect of the Populist environmental worldview is the concept of 
resource sovereignty, the idea that local populations should be able to dictate the use of, and 
receive the benefits from, exploitation of local resources.64 This idea has been enshrined in 
international law in the form of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803, which 
declares that states enjoy “Permanent sovereignty” over resources contained within their borders, 
and are free to develop them as they see fit.65 Historically, international law around resource 
sovereignty has been written with an eye towards protecting the interests of the developing 
world.66 The same core concepts however, can easily be applied to populations within the 
developed world, a point which is unlikely to escape the notice of populist parties. 
This brings us to the last distinctive feature of populist attitudes towards the environment: 
human-centrism. The populist right tends to emphasize the utility of an ecosystem to its human 
occupants, whether in the case of “wise use” advocates67, UKIP’s criticism of European fishery 
policies68 or Polish criticism of logging restrictions.69 This tension between conservation – the 
belief in husbanding natural resources for the common good – and preservation – the belief in the 
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protection of nature “for its own sake” is a recurring struggle within environmental policy-
making, dating back at least to the late nineteenth century.70 As the examples above show, the 
right has tended to come down on the side of nature-as-a-resource. Those who oppose resource 
exploitation on preservationist grounds are frequently accused of standing in the way of progress 
and prosperity, as in the controversial 1982 House of Representatives report “The Specter of 
Environmentalism.71   
It is important to understand that the populist environmental framework did not spring 
into existence ex nihilo. It is also equally important to note than many of the characteristics here 
ascribed to the populist could also be assigned with equal fairness to the left. Condemnation of 
the disruptive effects of globalization and an emphasis on local self-determination are common 
elements of the Green Movement as well.72 That is precisely the point. Most of the themes 
discussed above have deep historical roots, and can be detected in land-use disputes from earlier 
periods.  
A full discussion of land-use conflicts throughout history is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, there are two historical case studies worth highlighting, which contextualize 
these themes in a broader historical tradition and which have bearing on modern environmental 
policy conflicts. This paper will focus on the discourse around poaching in the English political 
and literary tradition, and on the so-called “Sagebrush Rebellion” in the United States. Both of 
these case studies pitted local actors against centralized authority in a struggle over resource-use 
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rights. Both were also characterized by the local actor mobilizing to defend its perceived 
traditional rights and privileges in the face of law and policy changes i.e., reactive radicalism. 
Historical Antecedents: Land-Use Populism in the English Tradition 
The English literary and cultural tradition provides many examples of what could be 
described as “land-use populism”, depicting the intra-national struggle over resource control and 
exploitation in class terms, as will be shown below. One of the most common is the dispute over 
game-poaching and the English forestry laws. This conflict has featured in English literature and 
politics for centuries,73 and was an influential issue in the 19th-century debates over the Corn 
Laws,74 the repeal of which marked a significant shift in British economic policy.75 
 The beginning of English forestry laws are sometimes traced to the era of William the 
Conqueror.76 “The Rhyme of King William,” an eleventh-century poem, condemns William’s 
overly harsh policies in strong terms: “Whoever slew a hart or a hind was to be blinded…the rich 
complained and the poor lamented, but he was too relentless to care that all might hate him.”77 In 
fact, laws about forest-usage predated William, but the Norman Conquest seems to have 
introduced newer, and significantly harsher laws – or at least, they were popularly perceived that 
way.78 Nor did the laws become less severe in time; on the contrary, as population growth placed 
increasing pressures on the forest, royal authorities seem to have doubled down on their 
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prerogatives.79 As late as 1198, Richard the Lionheart increased the penalty for poaching to 
include the loss of testicles.80 As seen from “The Rhyme of King William” above, the forestry 
laws were the object of controversy and popular disdain almost from the moment they were 
introduced. A frequent implication of the criticism of William’s policies was that he set the 
welfare of wild animals on the same level, or even above, that of his human subjects.81 This 
would become a recurring motif in the discourse around forestry laws.82 It seems likely that 
much of the hostility towards these forest laws was because of their perceived foreign nature;  
some scholars believe these laws to represent “one of the sharpest breaks in English society after 
1066.”83 Their existence was seen as threatening the traditional forest-use privileges that had 
previously belonged to all Englishmen.84 
 That being the case, it is unsurprising that vernacular English has a long tradition of 
glorifying poachers as romantic and dashing figures. The genre of “forest law parody” emerged 
shortly after the Norman conquest, and English popular literature continued to mine this vein for 
centuries afterward.85 The fictional image of the heroic poacher intersected in frequent and 
surprising ways with on-the-ground reality, as actual poachers patterned themselves after literary 
models, and as literature incorporated real-life examples.86  
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 These outlaw ballads often featured themes of savage violence. In Robyn and Gandelyn, 
a pair of poachers are attacked by, presumably, a forester, without even the pretense of a trial.87 
In the exchange of arrows, one of the poachers, Robyn, is killed, and the surviving outlaw 
Gandelyn is shot through the crotch, in what may be a reference to the use of castration as 
punishment specified in earlier iterations of the forest code.88  Often these stories contain themes 
of inverting or overthrowing perceived tyrannical authority. In The Tale of Gamelyn, the titular 
protagonist goes so far as to kill the sheriff and the jurors who condemned him for poaching, and 
assume the title of King’s Forester himself.89 
 In these ballads, violations of the forest law is framed as a form of upward social 
mobility. In Robin Hood and the Monk, Robin and the outlaws charge travelers through the 
woods for the privilege of traversing “their” territory.90 This practice is not simple opportunistic 
extortion. In the 13th-century Forest Charter, hereditary foresters were given the right to charge 
travelers for guidance and escort through the forest.91 By charging travelers, Robin is assuming 
for himself the prerogative of those above himself in the hierarchy of authority. 
 The motif of violation-as-social mobility recurs in much of the literature around 
outlawry. The Parliament of Three Ages, a 14th century narrative poem, places considerable 
emphasis on hunting-as-aristocratic ritual.92 One of the primary characters of the poem, the 
anthropomorphic personification of “youth” speaks at length about the ceremonial trappings of 
the hunt as a form of noble self-assertion.93 It is significant that poaching was no by means a 
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crime only committed by the lower classes. On the contrary, men of rank comprised a small but 
significant minority of those charged with trespass in the King’s forest, for the purpose of killing 
the king’s deer.94 This seems to indicate that every level of the social hierarchy of Medieval 
England, people clashed with the rung above theirs over matters of hunting and land-use. 
Fundamentally, these struggles about land-use revolved around competition for social and 
economic privilege. In the framework of the populist: a struggle between “the people”, trying to 
uphold their traditional economic practices and “the elite”, attempting to outlaw those practices 
and monopolize resource access.   
 Tension over the poaching laws would arguably culminate with the 19th century 
testimony of Frederick Gowing, described by British Liberal statesman John Bright as “the 
greatest poacher in England.”95 The Select Committee on the Game Laws, formed in 184596, was 
devised by Bright as a public showcase for the injustice of the poaching laws, and as a way to 
hammer the parliamentary opposition.97 Gowing proved a star of the occasion, testifying vividly 
and at length about the popular opposition to the game laws and the frequency with which they 
were broken.98 Gowing’s testimony was symptomatic of the broader divisions of the era, in 
which modernizing reformers like Bright positioned themselves in opposition to the landed 
aristocracy.99   
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Historical Antecedents: The Sagebrush Rebellion 
In the United States, the conflict between “populist” environmentalism and wilderness 
preservation came to a head in the 1980s in the so-called “sagebrush rebellion.” On one side 
were populist local actors long accustomed to enjoying certain land-use privileges, motivated by 
the belief that Federal government was encroaching on their traditional rights.100 On the other 
side was an environmental movement firmly convinced that the “sagerush rebellion” and the 
counter-reaction it represented threatened to dissolve environmental protections in the name of 
development.101 It remains relevant to environmental policy conflicts today for two reasons. 
First, it directly foreshadows ongoing environmental disputes. Second, it demonstrates the extent 
to which the same themes that animated the conflicts over English game laws persisted centuries 
later in a different political context.  
 The roots of the conflict lay in the vast quantities of western land which were under 
Federal control, and in the ambiguity of Federal land-use policies, which delegated considerable 
latitude to administrative decision-makers. The figurative opening shot of the rebellion is 
generally considered to be the passage of Assembly Bill 413 by the Nevada state assembly in 
1979.102 The bill attempted to assert the authority of the state government over the approximately 
79% of the state’s land-area that was under the administration of the Bureau of Land 
Management.103 Other western states soon followed suit.104 All of these states had, as a condition 
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of statehood, been required to relinquish claim to large quantities of land to the Federal 
government, claims they now sought to re-adjudicate.  
 The status quo of Federal control had endured for over a century. But events in the 1960s 
and 1970s had begun to alarm local governments and local populations. Up until that time, the 
livestock industry – which depended on use of public land for grazing – had enjoyed a degree of 
preferential treatment from the Bureau of Land Management.105 Federal law specified grazing as 
the “dominant use” for Public land.106 But in the early 1960s, Federal policy began to shift 
towards one of “multiple use.”107 Likewise, advisory boards, previously dominated by stockmen, 
were expanded to include representation of wilderness advocates.108 Communities which 
depended on livestock and grazing began to feel less secure in their position. Complicating this 
issue was the legal ambiguity of “multiple use”. The language of multiple use gave considerable 
discretionary authority to the Federal Bureaucracy to determine how to prioritize the uses 
associated with any given piece of land.109 Confronted with the loss of both legal guarantees and 
a monopoly on bureaucratic influence, many western communities became increasingly fearful 
of a shift in policy. 
When examining the rhetoric of the Sagebrush rebellion, a clear message of populism and 
self-determination emerges. As a result of macro-economic trends, western states had 
experienced an influx of intra-national migration, while northern and eastern states had 
shrunk.110 In spite of this, western states were generally net-losers in Federal tax revenue.111 
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They resented this apparent disparity. Matters were further aggravated by President Carter’s 
high-profile budget reductions, which among other things slashed the available funding for water 
conservation projects at the exact time that the western states were experiencing a severe 
drought.112 This drought exacerbated the already significant strain that population influx was 
placing on Western infrastructure. In turn, Western states came to feel that they were effectively 
“footing the bill” for the rest of the country, their local communities being disrupted by outside 
forces over which they had no control.  
These anxieties were formulated, not in terms of development or preservation, but self-
determination. One of the major complaints cited by western states was the environmental 
damage wrought by development projects, charging that they were being treated as “an energy 
colony” by the rest of the country.113 When the Western Governors Regional Energy Policy 
Office was formed in 1975, one of their first items on their agenda was, ironically, enacting 
Federal strip-mining legislation.114 In this context, the “left-right” and “preservation-
development” divides were entirely orthogonal to the question at hand. Questions of local 
sovereignty were far more important.  
  The historical record suggests that the fear of western landowners had concrete political 
repercussions. Ronald Reagan actively courted the votes of the “sagebrush rebels” while 
criticizing the excesses of the environmental movement.115 Following his victory in 1980, 
Reagan appointed James G. Watt as Secretary of the Interior, effectively delivering on his 
promise to the western states to “work towards a sagebrush solution.”116 Watt soon became a 
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bete noire to the environmental movement, aggressively rolling back environmental protections 
and courting controversy with his provocative public posture.117  Although Watt eventually 
resigned under intense public pressure118, Reagan’s ascendancy marked, in many ways, the high-
water mark of the environmental movement. Prior to this period, environmental protection had 
been framed as a largely bipartisan issue.119 Reagan entered office on the wave of a “counter-
revolution”120 and dramatically challenged the policy status quo. Republican support for 
environmental legislation would decline steadily through the ensuing decades.121  
Case Studies: Modern Environmental Policy Conflicts 
We have shown, in the previous sections, how conflicts over what we would now term 
environmental policy have been a feature of human society throughout recorded history. We 
have also discussed the distinctive components of the populist’s attitudes towards the 
environment, and shown how those ideas are not uniquely modern concepts but have deep-seated 
historical roots. What remains is to examine the recent “populist surge”, and to ask to what 
extent, if any, these movements have been driven by environmental policies. 
This paper will focus on two case studies both occurring within the United States in the 
past two decades: the decline of coal-mining in West Virginia and the 2016 occupation of the 
Malheur wildlife refuge. These case studies have been selected for several reasons. First, they 
involve environmental-policy conflicts with the features discussed above. They pit relatively 
small marginalized communities against a central government perceived as overbearing and 
hostile to traditional, local culture and life-style, and they showcase many of the familiar 
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rhetorical tropes this paper has previously identified. Additionally, ethnographic researchers have 
conducted extensive fieldwork within the affected communities, making it possible to glean 
insights into the thought process of local actors. Lastly, although there are similarities between 
these two cases, there are also important differences. In some respects, they are a study in 
contrasts.      
Case Study: West Virginia 
Historically, West Virginia has had a deep and intense economic and societal relationship 
to the extractive-resource industry. In the late nineteenth and early-twentieth century, the state 
underwent a massive wave of growth and industrialization as commercial and industrial interests 
sought to exploit the state’s abundant mineral resources.122 In places where such resources were 
concentrated, the growth was often extraordinary; one county experienced a population growth 
of 155.3 percent over a single decade.123  The relationship that existed between the miners and 
their corporate overseers often bordered on the neo-feudal124, with company leadership 
controlling virtually all aspects of civic and economic life within so-called “company towns.”125  
This relationship would often prove contentious over the years. The first known outbreak 
of violence between miners and mine-companies seems to have occurred in 1908.126 In 1912, a 
strike that began peacefully escalated into violent confrontation.127 This violence would 
continue, in one form or another, for nearly a decade, culminating in the “Mine War” of 1921, 
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where Federal troops were mobilized against armed miners.128 In spite of this, coal mining 
remained an integral aspect of community identity for many West Virginians. In 1987, residents 
of McDowell county—the same county which had experienced such rapid growth in the early 
1900s—would actually attempt to lease the local mine from its corporate owners rather than 
allow it to fall out of use.129 As of 2017, coal contributed $12.9 billion to the state’s $77 billion 
GDP.130  
Accordingly, it not surprising to find cases where local actors have clashed with Federal 
Agencies over environmental regulations. The attitudes of the local actors may be judged from 
their testimony before the Environmental and Public Works Committee of the United States 
Senate. Senator Shelley Capito stated that “While it may be uncomfortable for EPA officials to 
face the coal miners whose livelihoods and whose communities are threatened by those 
regulations, I think West Virginian’s deserve to have their voices be heard.”131 One local 
businessman asserted “We had over 170, 80 mines a year ago. Now we’re down to 70, 80…The 
EPA is making good headway, which we support, for clean air and the environment. In a 
regional timeframe, that would be good. But as they press…stricter and stricter regulations…the 
regulations are pushing people out of work and leaving this industry. Our revenues are killing 
us.”132  
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It might be possible to dismiss such words as the self-serving rhetoric of economic elites, 
intended to preserve their own interests at the expense of the local population. But these attitudes 
are not limited merely to business owners. Social and Anthropological research suggests that in 
fact, many of the state’s residents share these beliefs. Phillip G Lewin, who conducted extensive 
fieldwork in West Virginia, noted “ ‘EPA’ constituted a de facto swear word in Shale 
County…the narratives of those with whom I interacted in face-to-face conversations suggested 
that prosperity would be restored if oppressive regulators would grant new permits and cease 
meddling in the regions affairs.”133 Lewin’s subjects tended to believe that the region’s 
socioeconomic problems were either directly caused by, or severely exacerbated, by the 
environmental policies of the Federal Government.134 They maintained this attitude even though 
only a vanishingly small percentage of the population was in fact employed within the coal 
industry.135    
The archetype of the coal-miner in the cultural imagination of Lewis’ interviewees is 
worth commenting on as well. Lewis describes mining as having “heroic, if not sacred” 
significance to the residents of Shale county.136 The miner is lionized as figure of courage and 
prowess, whose sacrifices enable a better life both for his family137 and the country at large.138 
One of Lewin’s subjects opines in an editorial “They [miners] went where no man had went 
before and faced death each day…Their backs were arched from crawling or bending over 
walking in coal…for the love of their families…This is one Shale Countian who is proud to be a 
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coal miner’s son.”139 The romanticizing of coal mining is likely related to the lack of comparably 
remunerative jobs elsewhere within Shale County.140 Working class-men without mining jobs i.e. 
the majority of residents were frequently only marginally employed and dependent to a greater or 
less degree on government assistance, a position many found humiliating.141 Those with secure 
mining jobs experienced anxiety about falling down the socio-economic ladder.142 
The valorization of the coal miner is also related to regional self-consciousness, and a 
sense that they are looked down on by the rest of the country.143 Lewin’s informants are 
profoundly sensitive to the idea that “outsiders” view them as backwards, impoverished, and 
ignorant – while hypocritically reaping the benefits of Appalachian coal.144 As demonstrated in 
the previous paragraph, most of Shale County’s residents are intimately aware of the human cost 
of coal extraction, viewing coal-mining as a heroic sacrifice. Although they would presumably 
not classify their region as an “internal colony”, as some scholars have,145 they do have a sense 
that the country at large has benefited at their expense – and having taken what they need, wishes 
to cut them loose.146  
The case of Shale County furnishes a number of parallels with poaching and the English 
Game-laws. The miner is depicted as a romantic figure, whose skill and bravery directly benefit 
his family members. There is even a body of folk-song commemorating his role, much as the 
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medieval ballads commemorated the poacher. 147 Popular attitudes towards environmental 
protection laws and authorities resemble those towards the game laws. One of Lewin’s subjects 
mentions “Obama’s EPA”148 in the same tones the medieval ballads use for “King William”.149 
As with King Williams game laws150, EPA policies are perceived as an imposition by a hostile 
force, interfering with traditional culture – and directly limiting the socio-economic mobility of 
local residents.  
  It is difficult to precisely quantify the political repercussions of these attitudes. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest a concrete impact. In the 2016 presidential campaign, 
Trump’s rhetoric appealed directly to those who felt that the regulation of fossil fuels had gone 
too far.151 He vowed “We’re going to save the coal industry”, to reduce regulation of the energy-
extraction industry, and to dissolve US participation in burdensome climate-protection treaties 
created by “foreign bureaucrats.”152 Trump subsequently won West Virginia by 42 percentage 
points, his second-widest margin of victory in any state.153 Subsequently, the Democratic 
governor of West Virginia, Jim Justice, switched to the Republican party.154  
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Case Study: Successors to the Sagebrush Rebellion 
Issues highlighted by the original “Sagebrush Rebellion” have never been fully resolved. 
For example, the 2014 Bunkerville, NV standoff between Clive Bundy and federal law 
enforcement officials,155 and the 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge 
Visitor Center in Princeton, OR156 are considered to be extensions of the Sagebrush Rebellion. In 
each instance, westerner activists engaged in an armed confrontation with Federal officials over 
land-use policies and challenged not only the specifics of Federal policy, but the very legitimacy 
of Federal land ownership and management.157 Both instances became a rallying cry for like-
minded individuals across the country.158 Although the Bundy’s rhetoric and actions were 
regarded by even by many sympathetic observers as extreme or counter-productive159, they 
nonetheless highlighted a significant issue for many western communities.  
 Since 1990, there has been an overall decline in land controlled by the Federal 
government.160 However, the vast majority of this reduction resulted from turning Alaskan land 
over to the state, and minor changes in the legal status of Department of Defense properties.161 In 
the eleven western states, the Federal government is estimated to own approximately 45.9% of 
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land,162 with the number as high as 80% in Nevada.163 In contrast, the percent of land owned by 
the federal government in the rest of the country is just over 4%.164 Because of the sheer amount 
of land owned by the Federal Government, many western ranchers remain dependent on public-
land grazing privileges to sustain their herds, primarily on land controlled by the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM).165 In 2017, of the BLM’s 154.1 million acres available for grazing, 138.7 
million acres were actually used for grazing purposes, with approximately 17, 800 grazing 
permits issued.166 Although the BLM generally operates at a deficit—spending more to manage 
its grazing program than it receives in fees167—any attempt to increase grazing fees has faced 
significant political opposition.168 Additionally, unauthorized grazing (i.e. grazing on federal 
land without paying any fees) remains a widespread occurrence, though it is difficult to estimate 
the precise scale of the problem.169 It was precisely this unauthorized grazing which led to the 
initial confrontation between Cliven Bundy and federal authorities – Cliven Bundy had, over the 
course of twenty years, accumulated unpaid fees in excess of a million dollars.170 
 Bundy and his associates articulate an idiosyncratic ideology, which denies the 
constitutional authority of the Federal government to own land171; in more expansive moments 
they refuse to recognize Federal government at all.172 Legal scholars agree that their 
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interpretation of Constitutional law is dubious in the extreme.173 But although the specifics of 
their claim may be indefensible, there is a larger body of philosophical and legal argument that 
lends some weight to their cause.174 
 Ann M. Eisenberg situates the claims of the Bundy’s in the larger context of what she 
calls the “Land Transfer Movement.”175 This loosely defined movement subsumes many other 
such movements and groups: the original “Sagebrush Rebellion”, the “wise use” movement and 
loosely organized bands of discontented locals.176 Bundy is far from the first westerner to 
essentially dare the Federal government to enforce its laws and policies.177 Nor is the support 
Bundy received from many figures in both the media and politics anomalous.178 Numerous 
western politicians have pushed back against Federal land-control and attempted, in various 
ways, to establish state or local control over these lands.179 
 Eisenberg frames the claims of these latter-day Sagebrush rebels in using well-
established legal precedents. She refers to “The exclusion argument”, an element of the 
common-law tradition with many years of standing.180 This is essentially the claim that 
concerned local actors are not given due representation in policy decision-making processes that 
have a direct bearing on them.181 Here again we encounter the motif of the distant 
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“establishment” and the oppressed locals.182 An example of this problem given is the tendency of 
Federal agencies to dismiss local concerns about planned projects as “insignificant”; one study 
found that such “insignificant” concerns included “cabin leases…mineral rights, grazing fees, 
road access, and military overflights.”183 
 This issue is compounded by a divergence between de jure and de facto law as it exists 
on Federally managed lands.184 Federal officials have tended to allow the status quo to persist in 
cases where locals have long enjoyed certain use privileges, even when those use privileges have 
no formal legal basis.185 This tends to leave those subject to the laws in a condition of perpetual 
uncertainty, at the mercy of administrative discretion.186 Eisenberg characterizes this as a 
“cardinal sin of government: arbitrariness.”187 Viewed in this light, the government’s escalation 
to cattle confiscation after Cliven Bundy had grazed his cattle for twenty years can indeed seem 
provocative.188 
 The relationship between the “establishment” and “the people”(e.g., between Federal 
authorities and local communities) need not always be adversarial.189 Ironically, Harney County 
Oregon, where Ammon Bundy and several armed men occupied the Malheur Wildlife Refuge, 
was noteworthy for the unusually good relationship between Federal agencies and locals.190 The 
Bundy’s attempt at provoking a confrontation ended ultimately, not with a bang, but a whimper, 
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in large part because of the effective working relationships Harney County residents had 
established with Federal authorities.191 
 Harney County, and the Malheur occupation, are worth examining in some detail because 
they form a sort of microcosm of many of the tensions surrounding Federal land management 
throughout the American west. The county is sparsely populated, with only .71 persons per 
square mile.192 About 16% of the population lives at or below the poverty line.193 At one time, 
the county enjoyed significant revenue logging revenue, but this industry has declined 
substantially since the early 1980s – albeit for reasons largely unrelated to Federal land policy.194 
Although the primary source of income for most residents is farming,195 the county would 
probably not be able to function effectively without some degree of federal funding.196 Nearly 
three-quarters of the land in Harney County is owned by the Federal government.197 Perhaps 
most saliently, the BLM has over time reduced the number of grazing permits issued by more 
than half, from a high of over a hundred thousand to just over forty thousand.198  
 Many locals, while rejecting the Bundy’s tactics, are thus at least somewhat sympathetic 
to their goals. Said one resident: “[While desiring a peaceful resolution] Do we want them to go 
home…not necessarily. These people have brought us a voice…I don’t agree with what they did 
at the refuge, but I’m willing to listen to what those people have to say…"199 At one community 
meeting, major fault-lines amongst the local population became visible, with some condemning 
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the Bundy’s while others expressing a degree of cautious support for their goals if not their 
methods.200 One anonymous commenter referred to the moment as “an awakening.”201 
 In spite of this, relations between Harney County residents and the Federal Government 
remained generally good, both before and after the Malheur occupation.202 There appears to be 
no single event, person, or group responsible for the relatively productive and co-operative 
working relationship; no formula that could reasonably be replicated elsewhere.203 Rather it was 
a product of individual events and personalities, a series of precedents that built on each other. In 
2000, in response to a movement to designate local landmark Steen’s mountain as a national 
monument numerous local stakeholders established a working group that included 
environmentalists, ranchers, Paiute tribal leaders, and Congressional representatives.204 This 
group subsequently drafted alternative legislation creating a grazing-free zone in place of the 
proposed national monument, which was described by some as “precedent-setting”205 and which 
satisfied the interests of all parties.206 
 This in turn paved the way for similar subsequent initiatives. In 2013, another working 
group of broadly similar local actors produced the Malheur Comprehensive Conservation Plan, a 
several-hundred page document which was unique in Harney County’s recent history for not 
experiencing any significant legal opposition.207 To this day, Harney County is notable for the 
sheer number of collaborative planning groups which have proliferated in a relatively small and 
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sparsely populated area208: the High Desert Partnership (which focuses on building relationships 
between conservationists, government officials, ranchers and other local stakeholders)209, the 
Harney County Watershed Council (formed to address concerns about water scarcity)210, the 
Harney County Wildfire Co-operative (whose purpose is self-explanatory)211. In short, local 
actors have access to a number of avenues for expressing their concerns about environmental, 
political, and economic issues. 
 That being the case, it should not be surprising that so many Harney County residents 
rejected the Bundy’s agenda and methods, both before and after the Malheur occupation.212 But 
it would be an exaggeration to say that Harney County residents had wholeheartedly embraced 
environmental causes. In spite of their rejection of the occupation, Harney County residents 
voted overwhelmingly for Donald Trump in the 2016 election.213 President Trump in turn went 
on to pardon the Hammonds, local ranchers whose conviction for setting fires on BLM lands had 
provided much of the impetus for the Malheur occupation.214 As in the case of West Virginia, he 
has pursued a policy which emphasizes development and economic priorities at the expense of 
environmental concerns.215 There has been no research in Harney County to gauge the exact 
extent to which support for Trump was driven by environmental concerns, but it is clear that 
environmental policies matter significantly to local residents.  
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 The case of Harney County then is far more ambiguous than that of West Virginia. There 
are many familiar themes in both cases, themes that in some sense have featured in conflicts 
around environmental policy for centuries: development versus preservation, local actors versus 
“foreign” authorities, the invocation of an archetypical figure from national folk lore (in this 
case, the cowboy). But the tension here is less stark. Local and federal actors alike can find 
themselves straddling either side of the debate, at times butting heads and at times working 
together.  
 The data provided by these case studies is broadly consistent with the expectations set by 
the established literature. Both the modern day sagebrush rebellion, as manifested in Harney 
county, and the would-be coal miners of West Virginia share a view of the environment which 
stresses its utility to its human occupants. The ethnographic research indicates that both surveyed 
populations reject the idea of the environment as a good in and of itself. They display the human-
centric attitudes associated with the populist environmental framework. 
 Additionally, both surveyed populations place considerable emphasis on the exploitation 
of natural resources as a source of socio-economic mobility. In both cases, local communities 
live a relatively marginal existence, and both seek to supplement their limited income through by 
capitalizing on the natural wealth of their area. Restrictions on these efforts are perceived as an 
intrusion by a hostile and alien authority – the “corrupt elites” which act as a bogeyman for so 
much populist rhetoric. This too is in line with environmental populism. The residents of Shale 
County and Harney County may never have heard the phrase “resource sovereignty” but they 
understand the concept. The near-mythical status of the miner in West Virginia, whose labor 




 In spite of these similarities, one of our case studies reveals complexities that do not 
emerge in the standard model. Most analysis of the populist movements and the environmental-
management state assumes that the relationship between the two is fundamentally oppositional. 
Environmental protection and populism are thought to be incompatible, and the struggle between 
the two is conceived as a zero-sum game in which a victory for the environment comes at the 
expense of populists. But as Harney County shows, this is only the case if those environmental 
protections are dictated from “on high”, without local stakeholders having the opportunity to 
influence the process. When changes in the status quo are dictated by the center, reactionary 
radicalism by said stakeholders is a common, if not inevitable occurrence. 
 But it need not be this way. The case of Harney County, with its numerous forums for 
collaboration and consensus-based decision making shows that it is possible for environmental-
management agencies, operating at the political center, to forge productive working relationships 
with local communities. To the extent that populism continues to be a significant force in global 
politics, Harney County may offer an example in how to achieve environmental protection with a 
greater degree of popular legitimacy. Nor is this principle confined only to environmental issues. 
In an age of political centralization, it will become increasingly vital for those who make policy 
to seek feedback from those who feel policy’s effects. 
Conclusion: 
This paper began by describing the “populist backlash” to the environmental state as one 
instance of a larger phenomenon: reactionary radicalism. A survey of the historical literature 
established that in fact, many of the debates around environmental policy which occur today are 




common rhetorical tropes recur in the discourse of wide-ranging groups, separated by distances 
of space and time.  
 As is often the case in social science research, the data we have gathered raises further 
questions. It seems likely that in cases where the policies of the center have a significant impact 
on the livelihood – and even more than the livelihood, the cultural identity – of a population, that 
population is likely to mobilize against those policies. This seems likely to have been the case in 
West Virginia, with its unique and identity-defining relationship with the extractive-resource 
industry.  
On the other hand, the case of Harney County Oregon is much less conclusive. Although 
experiencing many of the same tensions with the political center, in the form of the 
“environmental-management state”, that West-Virginia residents feel, they have built a 
comparatively effective working relationship with it. Although some Harney County residents 
would likely dissolve the existing environmental regulatory structure if given that option, others 
see benefits in working with Federal agencies. This distinction may in part derive from the fact 
that Federal agencies provide clear and tangible benefits to local residents, in the form of 
infrastructure funding and services.  
It is probably impossible to isolate any single cause of the populist turn in the Democratic 
west. It does seem likely that, for certain communities and demographics, the perceived adverse 
social and economic consequences of administrative bodies they are unable to influence has been 
a contributing factor. To the extent to which populism represents a major challenge to 
established norms and modes of governance, places like Harney County may show a way to 





Cooperation: When Radicals Work With Mainstream Actors 
Introduction 
In the introduction, radicalism was defined as a spectrum. On the far end of this spectrum 
is the use of violence, whether explicit or merely threatened, as a tool for political change. 
Although liberal democracies pride themselves on their ability to arbitrate intra-state political 
disputes non-violently, the case studies in this chapter address instances where violent radicals 
have played a prominent role in political discourse. These case studies indicate that in cases 
where a mainstream political actor faces robust opposition from the center, mainstream actors are 
likely to develop militant, radical offshoots which tacitly cooperate with their more mainstream 
counterparts to advance their shared policy agenda. 
This chapter begins by examining the theoretical literature around both the causes and 
impacts of political militancy. It will then compare and contrast two major political movements 
within the United States: the environmental movement and the Civil Rights movement. Both 
occurred around the mid-to-late twentieth century, and both had significant impacts on American 
policy and law. One, however, had a highly-visible and influential radical militant element – in 
the form of groups like the Black Panthers – while the other did not. This chapter then examines 
the reasons why a larger proportion of the Civil Rights movements was drawn to militancy, and 
explain why that may have been strategically advantageous to the Civil Rights movement – an 
example of cooperation between more-radical and less-radical actors sometimes described as the 
“Radical Flank” effect. The available evidence suggests that a more-radical wing will grow when 
its less-radical counterparts face significant opposition to their agenda from the political center, 




group does not face deeply-entrenched opposition from the center (as was the case for the 
environmental movement roughly up to the Reagan era), it is unlikely to develop a major radical 
component. In the latter case, there will then be no cooperation 
Literature Review 
Most theoretical work about radical militancy focuses on causes rather than effects. 
Analysts have studied the ideological roots of violent action216, the organizational factors which 
shape the formation and operations of violent groups217, and the psychological complexities of 
radicalization. When academics do focus on effects, they tend to focus on its impact on civil 
discourse and popular support for state repression.218 There is not a great deal of work on the 
impacts of militancy on policy aside from policy specifically related to state security. However, 
there a few social science theorists whose work has an indirect bearing on the topic. 
 The term “radical flank” was first introduced by the sociologist Herbert H Haines219 – 
although the phenomena and the concept predate his terminology. Haines’ framework asserts 
that many social movements tend to splinter into “radical” and “moderate” factions. In American 
history alone, he cites the labor movement, the women’s rights movement, the anti-nuclear  
movement, and the black-rights movement.220 Theoretically, the interaction between the 
moderate and radical movements can be either positive or negative i.e. they may either 
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strengthen or undermine each other.221 Haines does not propose a detailed model explaining 
when or why positive or negative effects might obtain; his concern is mostly historical. Although 
Haines’ “radical flank” is not explicitly violent, more or less by definition, a violent group within 
the context of a domestic political dispute would be considered “radical” relative to their non-
violent contemporaries.  
The concept of the “Overton Window”, mentioned in the introduction, is also relevant to 
the impact of radical groups. Originally proposed by the sociologist Joseph Overton, the concept 
refers to the broad spectrum of “respectable opinions”, ideas which are taken seriously by policy-
making elites and by the general public.222 The Overton Window shifts and evolves over time, in 
ways which are not fully understood and are difficult to control. The issue of gay marriage 
provides an illustration: in 2004, 60% of respondents opposed gay marriage, while only 30% 
supported it. 15 years later, the proportions have reversed, with 61% supporting and only 31% 
opposing.223  Clearly, societal norms can change rapidly and in relatively brief periods. It is 
likely that the rise of radical groups is related, in some degree, to how far their goals and 
ideology are outside the “Overton Window”. Groups whose goals seem relatively benign, even if 
their tactics are extreme, are likely to have more recruits and enjoy better relationships with 
mainstream political actors than those who objectives strike most of their society as beyond the 
pale. 
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In turn, a state’s ability to violently repress militant groups is strongly contingent on the 
degree to which political elites are united in their opposition to the group’s aims and tactics i.e. 
the degree to which the militants are outside the Overton Window. Kieran McConaghy’s 
Terrorism and the State discusses the difficulties the French government had in combating the 
OAS, a right-wing group opposed to Algerian independence. Most of its members were one-time 
soldiers, and there was a significant and vocal segment of the population which supported a 
continued French presence in Algeria. Accordingly, the government’s efforts to combat the 
organization tended to be half-hearted and ineffectual. According to one observer “…the army, 
had it wished, could have crushed the OAS in 24Z hours. By doing nothing, it gave the 
Organization room…”224 
In Why Civil Resistance Works, by contrast authors Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan 
are emphatically interested in whether violent activism is more effective than non-violent 
activism. They conduct a statistical analysis of 323 campaigns of anti-government activism 
across the world. All the campaigns in the data-set are from 1906 or later; they include a wide 
range of objectives (territorial self-determination, civil and ethnic integration, etc) and a wide 
range of target-government types (democracy, military dictatorship, oligarchy, etc). They 
conclude that non-violent campaigns are roughly twice as likely to succeed as violent ones.225 
They theorize that this is because it is easier to mobilize large sectors of the population to 
participate in non-violent than violent campaigns. “The moral, physical, informational and 
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commitment barriers to participation are much lower for non-violent resistance than for violent 
insurgency.”226  
 They support this characterization with statistical data showing that, on average, non-
violent campaigns are significantly larger than violent ones.227 They offer many possible reasons 
for greater ease of participation; non-violent campaigns demand less commitment from 
activists228, are less likely to offend the moral sensibilities of potential recruits229, and are not as 
physically demanding as more militant forms of protest. In turn, they argue, greater mass 
participation is directly correlated with campaign success.230 In this model, as the movement 
expands in scope and support, it becomes increasingly difficult for elites to counter-mobilize 
against the movement. This is particularly true when members of the movement are linked, by 
ties of kinship or shared social background, to members of the regime themselves.231  It is 
difficult, say, for a militia commander to fire on a group of protesters when his cousin is among 
them, particularly if the protesters in question pose no imminent threat to the commander or his 
soldiers.  
 Chenoweth and Stephan’s model offers two fairly compelling generalizations: a) Non-
violent movements have an easier time attracting participants and b) greater participation is 
strongly correlated with movement effectiveness. In spite of this, they fail to address certain 
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questions which inevitably arise in the study of anti-government political movements. They 
acknowledge that in some cases, violent tactics have been effective. But they make little attempt 
to distinguish the precise circumstances (including regime type) under which violent tactics 
might be more successful. Moreover, their model does not address any potential interactions 
between violent and non-violent actors. They classify the campaigns in their dataset as either 
“primarily violent” or “primarily non-violent”, and let the matter go at that.232 The concept of the 
“radical flank” is addressed only briefly, and dismissed rather summarily. Chenoweth and 
Stephan believe that anything which appears to give the anti-regime movement a violent 
character tends to unite the elites against the movement, creating a “circle-the-wagons” effect; 
therefore the net effect of the radical flank on any movement is likely to be negative.233  
  Andrew Mack, in “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars” approaches the problem from the 
opposite angle. He is less concerned with social movements as such than the relationship 
between strong and weak actors, and the confluence of circumstances which allow weak actors 
to defeat stronger ones. He postulates a theory of asymmetric conflict which, although originally 
formulated to apply to inter-state wars, can be applied to internal conflicts like that between 
black militants and the United States government. Key to Mack’s theory is the distinction 
between an actor’s capability – the sheer amount of resources they can bring to bear on the 
problem – and their will to do so. In his framework, it is possible, and even likely, for stronger 
actors to have a less compelling interest in the outcome of a conflict than ostensibly weaker 
actors.234 This in turn lead’s to situations where “insurgent” movements can achieve victory 
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against stronger actors - “For the insurgents, the war is ‘total’, while for the external power, it is 
necessarily ‘limited’…because the opponent is weak and can pose no direct threat – the 
prosecution of the war does not automatically take primacy over other goals…which compete for 
state resources”235 Mack’s model illustrates an underlying similarity between violent and non-
violent movements: both focus on increasing the cost of maintaining an unpopular policy, under 
the assumption that at a certain point, this policy will become cost-prohibitive to the state.  
 Mack’s illustrations and examples are drawn primarily from the various post-colonial 
wars which were fought in the second half of the twentieth century. But the logic he describes is 
equally valid for intra-state conflicts. In particular, one aspect of his theory serves almost as a 
direct rebuttal to Chenoweth and Stephan’s mobilization thesis. Mack points out that weak actors 
can actually grow stronger by provoking strong actors to a disproportionate response - such as 
the French in Algeria.236 This in turn causes the weak actors base of support to rally around 
them, in response to the perceived increase in the severity of the threat. By escalating the 
conflict, they shift the balance of forces in a way which is favorable to themselves. Implicit in 
Mack’s theory is the assumption that these new recruits will throw themselves behind a military 
struggle. But in the context of internal political struggles, it is equally possible that these recruits 
will align themselves with non-violent movements; paradoxically, a militant organization could 
strengthen a non-militant parallel movement simply by making neutrality an untenable option.  
 Another critical variable in the relationship between violent and non-violent campaigns 
and the state is the media. As Mack’s work implies, the struggle between militants and counter-
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militants is fundamentally a struggle to shape the will of the polity, rather than an attempt to 
establish control through sheer physical force. Given that the interaction between militants and 
the state is largely shaped by popular perception237, the media is in some sense the arena in 
which this struggle is adjudicated. This is particularly true for democratic societies, which have a 
tradition of a free press, and in which media coverage can have a significant impact on the 
policy-making process.238  
In principal, the potential relationship between radical militants and the media may range 
across the spectrum, from complete indifference on the part of the media to complete hostility on 
the part of the terrorists.239 In practice, Matteo Vergani has characterized the relationship 
between terrorism and the media as one of symbiosis.240  One the one hand, terrorists want, 
above all else, recognition for their cause – what Margaret Thatcher called the “oxygen” of 
publicity.241 Such a goal is difficult to attain without the compliance of mass media. Mass media, 
on the other hand, want viewers, readers, and subscribers. In essence, both terrorists and media 
actors want attention, and they effectively, though non-explicitly, cooperate to get it. Some 
observers have gone so far as to say that terrorism is a “product” of press freedom.242  
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 The press need not be sympathetic to militant ideology or goals for this relationship to 
occur. To be sure, such sympathy is the optimal attitude from the perspective of radical militants, 
who may attempt to cultivate relationships with key media personnel in an effort to shape media 
coverage.243 They may even go so far as to create their parallel media organizations, in an effort 
to nudge the public discourse in the direction they desire.244 But it is also possible for radical 
militant groups to benefit even from fundamentally unsympathetic coverage. Terrorism can be 
characterized as a form of psychological warfare,245 in which reporting which makes militant 
groups appear dangerous or threatening may be ultimately be beneficial to the militants, by 
solidifying their support among those who are sympathetic and increasing their perceived 
potency amongst threatened groups. 
 Democratic governments faced with this situation are relatively constrained in their 
options for response. The United States has strong protections for freedom of the press, making it 
impossible for the center to shut down terrorist publicity by sheer fiat. At best, it can can hope 
for framing which de-legitimizes the militant’s cause and which emphasizes the capability and 
legitimacy of counter-militant forces, and which privileges official sources and viewpoints over 
that of the militants.246 The center may exploit the perception of threat in order to increase 
political and bureaucratic support for their own agendas. Much like their militant counterparts, 
government forces desire to be perceived as the strong horse247 in any conflict. 
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These key takeaway from this literature is that even in democratic societies, there may be 
advantages to employing radical tactics in pursuit of political goals, and that mainstream actors 
may in fact be incentivized to cooperate with their more radical counterparts, if they share a 
common agenda. Clearly, not all militant organizations are cut from the same cloth. Some will 
pursue objectives far outside of their host society’s Overton window, will receive little public 
sympathy, and will probably be swiftly crushed. Others, however, may pursue goals that enjoy 
broad support, may receive both popular and elite sympathy, and may successfully resist 
government pressures to disband. Having laid the theoretical groundwork, we will now proceed 
to examine the two contrasting cases specified in the introduction.  
Case Studies 
For purposes of this paper, I will subsume any form of political activism which contains 
organized violence, or the implicit threat of organized violence, under the name “militancy.” I 
exclude isolated cases of violence by “lone wolves”, unless those lone wolves are acting as part 
of a broader group. I include cases where the threat of violence was latent rather than actual i.e. 
large armed groups who never actually engaged in mass violence. This is an important 
distinction. It is the threat of violence, as much as the reality of it, which motivates policy-
makers. Per Mack’s model, violent weak actors do not seek to physically compel their opponent 
to abandon a certain course of action. Rather they wish to raise the cost of that course of action, 
to the point where it becomes cost-prohibitive. A large armed movement which has not yet 
erupted into violence is quite capable of doing this, so long as they are perceived to be a serious 




larger movement, are unlikely to make any course of action cost-prohibitive. A Leon Czolgosz248 
does not, of himself, effect change; an army of Leon Czolgosz imitators conceivably could.  
Social Roots of American Environmentalism 
The high-water mark for the environmental movement in the United States occurs 
roughly between 1962, when Rachel Carson published the influential Silent Spring and 1980, 
when Ronald Reagan was elected president. In this time, several significant legislative 
achievements permanently institutionalized several key policy objectives of the environmental 
movement, and remain central to American environmental policy to this day. The key findings 
from the history of the American Environmental movement was that it’s progress (up until the 
Reagan Era) was characterized by gradually increasing public support without the emergence of 
a correspondingly effective opposition movement at the political center. In such a climate, there 
was little strategic advantage to be had by forming an alliance between less-radical and more-
radical groups. Accordingly, none emerged.   
The National Environmental Policy Act (1970) created the administrative requirement for 
federal agencies to conduct assessments on the environmental impact of their actions.249 The 
Clean Air Act (1963) created several federal agencies which were tasked with developing 
emissions-control standards for industry, provided funding for pollution-control research, and, 
crucially, allowed citizens to file civil suit for failure to comply with pollution standards.250 The 
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Clean Water Act (1972) created a system of regulation for dissemination of industrial by-
products into water sources.251 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976) established 
standards for solid-waste disposal252, while the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability act (1980)253 – the so-called “Superfund” act –  established a process 
for repairing previous environmental damage, whenever possible at the expense of the 
responsible party. Most subsequent environmental policy, whether legislative or administrative, 
derives in some sense from these acts. But these acts were themselves the product of slowly-
building legislative pressures which had begun decades before.  
The environmental movement in America has a long a history. Dorceta Taylor, in The 
Rise of the American Conservation Movement states that “environmentalism started as an urban 
phenomenon.”254 The rapid urbanization associated with the industrial revolution engendered 
ambivalent feelings among those elites who were the beneficiaries of this societal 
transformation. “the city both fascinated and troubled them. Their desire to enrich 
themselves…and exert power…drew them to the cities.”255 Simultaneously, however “they were 
appalled and alarmed by what they perceived as its disorderliness and its rampant 
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immorality….long before wilderness advocates…began campaigning to protect remote natural 
spaces, urban environmental activists campaigned for environmental protection.”256  
Given the interest of elites in environmental causes,257 it is not surprising that the 
environmental movement became embedded in the broad constellation of public causes which 
percolated through American civic and political discourse. Per Anne-Marie Todd, America’s 
natural landscape came to be perceived as a uniquely American cultural treasure, a rival to the 
grandiose architecture (and implied superior heritage) of Europe.258  In the early twentieth 
century, a number of Americans began promoting western tourism as an explicit alternative to 
the European “grand tour” that east-coast elites traditionally undertook.259 As the country 
became embroiled in two world wars, and subsequently the cold war, the rhetoric of 
environmentalism became entangled with the rhetoric of national security.260 The conservation of 
resources was no longer simply a good idea; it was vital to the survival of the state. 
The environmental movement intensified in the wake of the second world war, for 
several reasons. Karl Boyd Brooks traces the beginning of modern environmentalism to the post-
war middle-class of the late 1940s. Flushed with new-found political and economic security, a 
coalition formed between ardent outdoors enthusiasts and a broader American public who might 
have little practical experience of “the wilderness” but who nonetheless liked the idea of it.261 
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The surge in post-war environmental legislation was also driven by a paradox of 
prosperity. On the one hand, America’s growing economy was the proverbial rising tide, offering 
upward mobility to a generation. These newly-well-off Americans migrated en-masse to the 
suburbs, took an active role in civic life, and often took up the outdoor recreation that had been, 
in previous eras, the province of the elite. But at the same time, the post-war economy shone a 
light on the environmental costs of growth – costs which threatened in turn to undermine 
continued prosperity. 
 Nowhere was this paradox more evident than in South California. Los Angeles, and the 
adjacent counties, nearly tripled in population from 1941 to 1950.262  The soon-to-be-infamous 
LA smog first became a concern during this time, spurring the passage of the 1947 Air Pollution 
Control act.263 This was followed in 1949 by the passage of the Dickey Water Control act.264 
Although there was some opposition to these new laws from the business community, most 
prominent Californians felt that these laws were, if anything, necessary to ensure the continued 
growth of their economy. The laws were perceived as enablers of capitalism, not restrictions on 
it.  The slowly building mass of state-laws would subsequently help to inspire Federal action on 
environmental issues. 
What becomes clear, on studying the history of American environmental law, is that it 
did not spring into existence ex nihilo.265 Rather, most of these laws were the products of long-
percolating trends within American legal and political thought. Indeed, there is an argument to be 
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made that disputes over environmental law have deeper roots in the English-speaking world than 
disputes over race relations; “The Rime of King William”, an anonymous poem dating to the 11th 
century, contains a blistering critique of William the Conquerors forestry laws.266 Most of the 
concerns addressed by the major pieces of legislation listed at the start of this section had been 
topics of discussion for decades.  
Legal Roots of American Environmentalism 
For much of American history, environmental issues were left to the states. Nonetheless, 
there were a few pieces of legislation whose significance mostly derives from the fact that they 
laid the groundwork for further action, as the environmental lobby which was active at the state 
level began to emerge as a national presence. One of the most significant such precursors was the 
Fish and Wildlife Co-ordination Act. The act represented an early clash between, on the one 
hand, the industrializing forces of the state, and the tentatively solidifying environmental 
consciousness of middle-America.267   
The FWCA was an attempt by local stakeholders to push back against the industrializing 
tendency of the new-deal administrative state. The Department of the Interior, along the with US 
Army Corps of Engineers, embarked in an extensive program of dam-building throughout the 
United States. These dams were nominally intended to provide cheap hydro-electric power; in 
effect they often became quasi-Keynesian projects in which the federal government effectively 
allied itself with local economic interests.268 During the era of the New Deal and subsequently, 
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the second world war, there had been little public interest in opposing these programs. But that 
was changing.  
The initial Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act had, in 1934, established fish and wildlife 
management as a Federal concern. But this concern was mostly symbolic; the act made 
suggestions, not requirements for Federal agencies involved in large-scale construction 
projects.269 The 1946 Amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Act made it mandatory for Federal 
agencies to consult with Fish and Wildlife authorities prior to any project in which “waters…are 
to be impounded, diverted, or otherwise controlled.”270 In 1958, the act was amended again to 
direct that wildlife conservation be given “equal consideration” with other concerns in 
considering large-scale construction projects. 
Also in 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedures Act. The act was the 
culmination of a decades-long push for greater oversight of the newly-emerging administrative 
state. It established a process for public commentary on proposed decisions by administrative 
agencies, and, most critically, established a procedure for judicial review of administrative 
decisions.271 By opening up the policy-making process to the general public, the APA helped to 
create a cottage industry of environmental activists and commenters.272 The push-pull between 
local and federal authorities for control of natural resources would become a recurring element of 
environmental politics.  
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 Once the gates had been opened, environmental lawmaking steadily snowballed.273 
Political activism, legislation, and judicial wrangling fed each other in a positive feedback loop, 
with each new law giving rise to further legal battles and, in turn, additional legislation.274 These 
laws were generally not sweeping legislative acts intended to promote the welfare of the 
environment for its own sake. Rather they were responses to the problems of industrialization, 
and were phrased in terms of their impact on human, rather than ecological, welfare.  
 The Clean Air Act of 1963 followed a trajectory similar to the at of the Fish and Wildlife 
Co-ordination act. It was preceded by the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955. Like the original 
Fish and Wildlife Co-ordination act, the Air Pollution Control Act acknowledged a problem – in 
this case, air pollution – while taking relatively few steps to actually remedy it.275 Actual 
legislation of pollution was considered to be a state and local problem. Over time, public support 
began to build for federal action on the issue, culminating in the acts passage in 1963. Like the 
earlier Administrative Procedure Act, the Clean Air Act established a legal avenue for citizens to 
redress environmental damage, in this case by allowing citizens to sue for violation of Clean Air 
standards.276  
 The Clean Air Act was not unusual in being the latest iteration of a series of 
environmental policy decisions. The Clean Water act was preceded by the Federal Water 
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Pollution Control Act (1948), and by the Water Pollution Control Act (1956).277 The Resource 
Conservation and Recover Act (1976) was preceded by the Solid Waste Disposal Act (1965) and 
by the Resource Recovery Act (1970).278 Social trends and legal activism reinforced each other 
in a positive feed-back loop, with each new law creating the opportunity for more activism, 
which in turn led to new laws.  
 The recurring pattern behind every one of these acts as that they were framed in terms of 
non-controversial solutions to problems which affected nearly everybody. Those who lost out 
from environmental legislation were a relatively small minority, with relatively little public 
traction. Fresh air, clean water, and healthy soil were largely uncontroversial causes, things 
which almost anyone could get behind.279 No one was going to stand up for pollution, after all. 
The environmental debate was generally framed as a case of the public against – at worst – a 
small handful of irresponsible industrialists – and, at best, as a case of simple common sense.  
 A sense of the popular legitimacy the environmental agenda enjoyed may be seen in the 
voting record for various key pieces of legislation. For example, the National Environmental 
Policy Act passed the Senate with a unanimous vote, and the House with a vote of 372 for to 15 
against.280 The Clean Water Act was not quite so successful, but was still an example of broad 
bi-partisan consensus, with the Senate over-riding an initial presidential veto by a vote of 52 in 
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favor to 12 against, and the House voting 247 in favor to 23 against.281 Just under a third of the 
Senators and nearly 40% of the Representatives who voted in favor were Republicans. The 
Environmental-Protection agenda would arguably not become a matter for partisan controversy 
until the “Sagebrush Rebellion” and the Reagan Era, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 Against this backdrop of broad support, it is unsurprising that the Environmental 
movement only rarely manifested in a radical form. It is probably significant that Earth First!, the 
most noteworthy and influential “environmental extremist” organization appeared in 1979-
1980282, just as mainstream environmentalism had reached its high tide of influence.283 As soon 
as the environmental movement set itself in opposition to “progress” – to the march of science, 
industry, and prosperity, it began to lose steam. So-called “eco-centrism”284, a view of the world 
which privileged environmental welfare as a value for its own sake, was always going to be a 
hard sell to the mainstream American public, and remains so to this day. To the question “Should 
Trees Have Standing?’285, most of the voting public has answered, and continues to answer, 
“no.”  
The scholarly consensus around the environmental movement indicates that its success 
correlated largely with the degree to which its aims were non-controversial and enjoyed elite 
support. When the movement took a radical turn, it began to lose traction. To the extent to which 
the environmental movement employed militant tactics, they do not seem to have had much 
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effect. It is worth noting, however, that militant environmentalism always represented a small 
element of the environmental movement overall. Groups which employed “Monkeywrench” 
techniques were relatively few in number, and their actions took place on a small scale. 
Moreover, these forms of direct action were generally targeted against property, rather than 
people.286 They tended to appear as more of a nuisance than a serious threat. This forms a 
striking contrast with our next case study. The Civil Rights Movement faced far more deeply-
entrenched opposition from the political center and accordingly developed a far more active 
militant wing, one which aspired to threaten the State itself, a threat taken quite seriously by 
those charged with the defense of the State.  
The Civil Rights Movement  
Like the environmental movement, the Civil Rights Movement had its roots in the 
nineteenth century. But unlike the environmental movement, the discourse around the rights and 
status of African-Americans had always had undertones of violence. Violence against newly 
enfranchised blacks and against Republican political operatives contributed significantly to the 
ultimate failure of Re-construction and to the continued second-class status of African-
Americans throughout the country.287 Viewed in this light, the violence of the sixties and 
seventies is just one more episode in a long series of such.  
The full history of the Civil Rights movement is too involved a topic to delve deeply into 
here. The key points of comparison to the previous section are two-fold. First, the Civil Rights 
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movement faced far more opposition from the political center than the Environmental 
movement. Second, the militant wing of the Civil Rights movement – as manifested in groups 
like the Black Panther party – was far more active, high profile, and apparently threatening than 
the militant wing of the Environmental movement. Precisely because the Civil-Rights movement 
faced such opposition, many of its supporters were drawn into more militant forms of political 
activism. Thus, a dynamic was created in which more-radical actors tacitly cooperated with less-
radical actors in an effort to advance a shared policy agenda.  
In the previous section, the voting records on key pieces of environmental legislation 
were used to show the depth and breadth of support the environmental movement enjoyed from 
the political center at the time. In contrast to the unanimously-passing National Environmental 
Protection Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed in the Senate by a vote of 73-27288, and 
289-126 in the Senate.289 There were actually more “nay” votes in the Senate than there had been 
for the earlier and weaker Civil Rights act of 1957.290 The 1964 vote was preceded by the longest 
continuous debate in Senate history, with opponents engaging in a protracted filibuster in an 
effort to block passage.291 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 faced similar levels of opposition.292293 
Opposition to the Civil Rights movement at the political center did not represent a majority per 
se, but rather a determined minority who had the political resources to obstruct the movement. 
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Nearly one-fifth of Congress was a signatory to the “Southern Manifesto”, calling on southerners 
to exhaust “all ‘lawful means’” in opposition to forced integration.294 No such comparable bloc 
existed at the time to oppose the environmental movement. Small wonder that in a 1969 Gallup 
Poll, 21% of respondents said that African-Americans “Will have to use violence” in order to 
gain their political rights.295 
Drawing a firm distinction between “militant” and “non-militant” elements in the black-
rights struggle is difficult to do, both because there were a wide range of attitudes about when 
and how violence be an acceptable tactic, and because many individuals re-thought their 
opinions over time. At one end of the spectrum is the ideal of complete non-violence. This 
school had very few adherents. Even Martin Luther King, though most famous as an advocate of 
non-violence, acknowledged violence in self-defense as legitimate.296297 Being under the threat 
of violence themselves, civil rights activists at times found themselves compelled to develop an 
organizational capability for violence. In 1965, in Bogalusa, Louisiana, attempts to register black 
voters were met with widespread harassment. In the absence of police protection, organizers 
formed “The Deacons for Defense and Justice” to provide armed escorts for civil-rights 
workers.298 The Deacons stressed that they were a defensive organization, and that they had no 
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intention of initiating any confrontation. Ultimately, even Martin Luther King lent support to the 
Deacons.299 
It is worth noting that the Black Panther Party, formed not long after the Deacons, was 
originally called “The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.” Over time, however, they began to 
debate exactly what “self-defense” consisted of. In the beginning, the Panthers were scrupulously 
adherent to the letter of the law regarding weapons ownership, and had, like the Deacons, 
adopted a policy of no-first-use. But as time went on, some members of the party began to push 
for more proactive approach. Eventually, the Black Panthers split between an ultra-militant 
tendency, championed by Eldridge Cleaver, and a reformist faction championed by founder 
Huey P. Newton.300301302 Ultimately, the party collapsed under the weight of police pressure and 
its internal dissension. 
It is clear that the Black Power movement – a term used here to refer to the whole 
continuum of explicitly-militant elements of the broader Civil-Rights movement – took pains to 
assert the morality of their armed stance.303 This was an important tactic; as mentioned in the 
first chapter, the more ambivalent the ruling class feels about a radical organization, the harder it 
will be to suppress the organization through sheer force. It is also clear that their cause enjoyed a 
degree of support from certain segments of the population – not only African-Americans, but 
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many young, college-educated sons and daughters of the American middle-class, and from 
prominent left-wingers at all levels of society.304 Insofar as their militant posture drew public 
attention to their cause, it seems to have been largely beneficial.305 Although it is difficult to 
prove with certainty, it also seems likely that fear of revolutionary violence played a major role 
in the passage of at least some civil rights legislation – primarily the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  
The ”long, hot summer of 1967” was the name given to the series of riots which 
occurred, appropriately enough, in the summer of 1967. These were not isolated incidents; they 
were the latest in a series of season bouts of urban unrest, which had occurred with increasing 
frequency every year since 1964.306 These riots led directly to the creation of the Kerner 
Commission, whose subsequent frank assessment of American institutional failure307 helped spur 
the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act.308 The riots were by and large spontaneous actions by 
frustrated inner-city dwellers. Nonetheless, they sensitized Americas leaders to the risks of 
continued indifference to the issues organized Black Power advocates sought redress for.  
Black Power in the Cold War 
It is also impossible to understand the rise and impact of Black Power without discussing 
the geopolitical and cultural context of the Cold War. Black Power was in some sense a product 
of the same cultural and intellectual ferment which gave rise to anti-colonialist movements 
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throughout the global south. As early as 1964, Malcolm X was proclaiming “we are just as 
thoroughly colonized as anybody.”309 After his death, the rhetoric of internationalist 
anticolonialism was taken up by the Revolutionary Action movement (RAM), which 
emphatically saw itself as another front in the struggle for a global communist revolution.310 The 
RAM’s ambitions and rhetoric were generally out of all proportion to their actual capability, but 
they paved the way for subsequent and better organized groups like the Black Panthers.  
 The Black Panthers would, over the course of their existence, gain international 
recognition. This in turn allowed them to forge more substantive ties, not only with political 
movements in other countries, but with actual nation-states. Cuba, with its geographic proximity 
and ardently anti-American foreign policy became a frequent safe haven for black nationalists 
forced to flee the United States.311 Algeria was another influential post-colonial regime which 
provided support and safe haven to exiled Black radicals.312  
 The place of Black Nationalism within the global left was never entirely comfortable or 
secure. The Soviet Union itself, which by this time had begun to shift away from a militant 
posture on the geo-political stage towards a policy of “détente” and preservation of the status 
quo, did not provide a great deal of support. Nonetheless, the Panther’s received backing from a 
host of post-colonial nations-states. Following his self-imposed exile (precipitated by the threat 
of a prison sentence), Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver embarked on a world tour which included 
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Cuba, China, North Korea and Vietnam, before ultimately establishing an “international branch” 
of the Panthers in Algeria.313  
It was during this exile that Cleaver’s views increasingly began to diverge from those of 
Newton. Newton generally spoke of violence in terms of “self-defense”, and had generally 
avoided head-on confrontation with the state. Following his imprisonment on charges of killing a 
police officer, Newton had refused the offer of a jailbreak and instead opted to wage a costly 
court battle.314 Newton, although sensitive to the symbolic appeal of black self-defense, and, to 
all evidence, quite serious about developing an armed capability, seems to have been 
increasingly skeptical about the strategic utility of direct confrontation.  
Cleaver, however, became increasingly convinced that the way ahead for the Panthers 
was full-on armed revolution. Following his flight from the United States, his attempts to set up a 
guerilla base of operations in Cuba was thwarted by the Cuban government’s desire to avoid 
provoking the United States.315 Later, in Algeria, he attempted to rally support from the Marxist 
bloc by arguing that the Black Panther party was uniquely positioned to strike at the soft 
underbelly of international capitalism.316 Later still, he developed the “Asian strategy”, 
attempting to build alliances with Vietnam and North Korea.317 This tension between the 
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revolutionary impulse and the more moderate policies advocated by Newton would ultimately 
culminate in the splinter of the Black Panther party. 
Cleaver’s rhetoric was always out of proportion to his successes. Ultimately, his efforts to 
create a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla army on American soil came to naught. But in the context of 
the Cold War, many thoughtful observers were prepared to take him seriously, to believe that he 
represented a potential threat to the entire socio-political structure of the United States. It seems 
likely that the Panther’s international celebrity and their embrace of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric 
were at the back of J. Edgar Hoover’s mind when he stated that the Panthers represented “the 
greatest threat to the internal security of the country.”318 
Conclusion 
How do the Civil Rights/Black Power and the Environmental movement/Militant 
Environmentalist movements compare with each other? First, there were significant degree of 
opposition they faced from the political center. Environmental issues were, for most of the 
nation’s history, profoundly bi-partisan. Most Americans took pride in their natural heritage and 
wanted it to be protected – all other things being equal. Environmentalism only became a 
controversial and partisan issue in the late twentieth century, after the election of Ronald Reagan. 
Clearly, the inoffensive goals of “mainstream environmentalists” like the Sierra Club were 
situated well within America’s Overton Window. As a result, there was little strategic advantage 
to be gained from alliance with more militant actors. It was for this reason that radical actors 
                                                          






never gained as much prominence in the environmental movement as they did in the Civil Rights 
movement. 
 The Civil Rights Movement, in contrast, faced well-organized and deep-seated resistance 
from the political center, as demonstrated by voting records and the number of influential 
politicians who signed the Southern Manifesto. For that reason, militancy had much wider appeal 
to Civil Rights supporters. This phenomena was arguably intensified by the diversity of opinions 
within the Black Power spectrum. For every Eldridge Cleaver, who wanted a full-on Marxist 
uprising, there was a Huey Newton, largely content to provoke the system but not bent on head-
on confrontation. Revolutionaries in theory were often reformist in practice. Nor was Huey 
Newton the far pole of black militancy. Newton still proclaimed himself a Marxist, but many 
advocates of Black self-defense were insistent that they only wanted the same freedoms as any 
other American. Although the Black Power elements of the broader Civil Rights movement often 
faced violent repression from local authorities, they also enjoyed support from broad swathes of 
the American public. The Kerner commissions final report is a testament to the degree to which 
decision-making elites were willing to concede the legitimacy of Black Power’s grievances, if 
not their tactics. The very fluidity of the Black Power spectrum, from highly-radical hardline 
Marxists to less-radical Black Self-Defense Advocates to nonviolent Civil Rights Activists made 
it easier for less-radical actors to form cooperative relationships with more-radical actors. 
 These different cases suggest a partial answer for the broader theoretical questions we 
raised at the start of this paper. In the case of environmentalism, it is likely that radical tactics 
were not deployed precisely because the environmental movement enjoyed broad and non-
controversial support. Moreover, the mounting cost of pollution, the risk that it might undermine 




pressure which kept the issues continually in the spotlight, maintaining the public will necessary 
to pass significant legislation over a prolonged period. It is possible that a more pronounced 
militant wing would have actually undermined the environmentalist cause by associating it with 
violence and extremism in the public consciousness. 
 In the case of the Civil Rights movement, however, the intensity of opposition from the 
center naturally contributed to rise of radical actors tacitly allied with their less-radical 
counteparts. Although their rhetoric and tactics may have been exceptional, they were only 
unusually fierce responses to grievances shared by a wide segment of the population. The 
difference was that the forces invested in maintaining segregation were more powerful and 
united than the forces arrayed against the environmental movement. 
 This model of intra-state political dynamics may give us some insight into conflicts 
which have yet to appear. In a democratic polity, issues on which the forces in conflict are 
decisively tilted one way or another are unlikely to give rise to a radical-mainstream alliance. 
Even highly controversial issues where the forces in conflict are broadly equal is unlikely to 
become violent. As long as the actors in question have equal access to the apparatus of 
government, it is unlikely that one side or another will see an advantage in making common 
cause with radical actors. However, in cases where a mainstream actor finds itself in opposition 
to a well-entrenched adversary with greater influence at the political center, the risk of radical 
militancy emerging increases accordingly.  
Although the previous chapter has demonstrated the circumstances under which radical 
actors are likely to appear and grow, it has not conclusively demonstrated the effects of said 
radical actors on the policy changes. There is insufficient data to demonstrate conclusively that 




is a strong possibility given the cold-war climate and degree of publicity the Panther’s received. 
J. Edgar Hoover’s denunciation of the Panthers as the greatest threat to national security in the 
country may have been partially grandstanding, but it arguably also reflected the prevailing 
national mood. Reform was preferable to revolution, after all. On the other hand, given that 
much of the Black Power movement aimed for Revolution rather than mere reform, they may 
have been considered a failure. Our next chapter will examine the importance of limited goals 
and elite patronage for radical actors, showing that is precisely those radical actors which share 























Confrontation: When Radicals Succeed 
The first chapter of this thesis dealt with reactionary radicals, showing how radical actors 
can emerge in response to changes at the center. The second chapter dealt with cooperation, 
showing the circumstances under which radical actors would cooperate with their less-radical 
mainstream counterparts. This chapter will deal with the circumstances which allow radical 
actors to succeed, at least partially, in their goals. The key findings are that successful radical 
actors enjoy elite patronage and pursue carefully delimited goals, often goals which are tacitly 
supported by a large percentage of the population. Additionally, radical actors are likely to be 
successful when the elites at the political center are divided and unable to effectively deploy the 
resources of the state to suppress them. High levels of partisanship, popular unrest, and intra-elite 
political competition combine to cripple the states ability to suppress radical actors, creating 
circumstances under which radical actors can thrive. 
The most recent and dramatic example of radical actors operating in the confrontational 
mode was of course the Capitol Hill Insurrection, in which a large crowd (possibly mobilized by 
a few key individuals)’ attempted to overthrow the elected government.319 Although the most 
dramatic in recent history, such phenomena are not unprecedented. As discussed below, there 
have been several attacks on the capitol over the nation’s history, as well as other, less high-
profile attacks on the organs of the state at various times and places. This chapter places these 
incidents in the larger context of American political history, showing the sociopolitical and 
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economic circumstances under which these kind of radical tactics are more likely to proliferate, 
and even succeed. 
A History of Violence 
Shocking though the events of 6 January 2021 were, they were not the first attack on the 
capitol.320 In 1915, a former Harvard Professor named Erich Muenter bombed the Senate in 
protest of perceived pro-British sentiments amongst the nation’s political elites.321 In 1954, 
armed Puerto Rican nationalists attacked the House of Representatives and wounded five 
congressmen.322 In 1971, the Senate was bombed by anti-war protestors323 later revealed to be 
the Weather Underground.324 In 1983, a group calling themselves the Armed Resistance Unit 
bombed the Senate in retaliation for US military intervention in Grenada and in Lebanon.325 The 
Capitol Hill riot, which claimed five lives, 326 has the dubious distinction of being the deadliest 
such attack. But as the evidence in this chapter shows it is not an isolated case, nor is violence as 
rare in American politics as sometimes assumed. On the contrary, violent radicals have played an 
at times outsize role the in the political process.  
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William Gamson, in his survey The Strategy of Social Protest suggests that as many as 
twenty-five percent of the fifty-three American social movements he surveys were involved in 
violence in some way.327 The targets of the violence varied widely. In some cases, as in Father 
Coughlin’s Christian Front Against Communism, or the case of the “Native American” party, the 
targets were members of “undesirable” groups (Jews and Catholics, respectively).328 In other 
cases, the use of violence was significantly more focused and deliberate, with groups such as the 
Tobacco Night Riders (examined in greater detail later in this paper) systematically intimidating 
individual opponents.329 
Gamson is not primarily interested in the social causes of violence, but rather its strategic 
utility or lack thereof to groups which use it. In this context, his analysis suggests that violence 
can in fact be a useful tactic. In fact Gamson makes the case that “unruly groups, those that use 
violence, strikes, and other constraints, have better than average success.”330 Gamson’s analysis 
“undermine the following line of thinking: that violence is the product of frustration, desperation, 
and weakness…an act of last resort…[which] merely hastens and insures its failure.”331 On the 
contrary, Gamson asserts, violence occurs when “hostility towards the victim renders it a 
relatively safe and costless strategy…the users of violence sense that they will be exonerated 
because they will be seen as more the midwives than the initiators of punishment.”332  
Critically, Gamson notes, most of those groups which successfully employed violence 
did not use it as a primary tactic. Instead, it was one aspect of a larger pressure strategy.333 His 
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analysis suggests that violence is more likely to occur when the leaders of a political movement 
perceive there is substantial support for their cause. Even if there is not support for violence per 
se among the general population, the leaders of a movement may still perceive violence as being 
instrumentally useful, particularly if it is used in controlled and targeted ways. When violence in 
the name of a popular cause is paired with selective violence against unpopular targets, it can 
help facilitate the ultimate victory of the popular cause. 
 As demonstrated in the case studies below, this is particularly true when those radical 
actors enjoy a degree of protection from members of the political elite and focus their violence 
on achieving relatively narrowly-defined goals. Three case studies that make up the bulk of this 
chapter: paramilitary violence in East Tennessee during the Civil War, the “Black Patch Tobacco 
War” in Eastern Kentucky, and the militia movement in the American Midwest. The first case 
study shows what happens when the political center disintegrates and political elites, rather than 
suppressing radical actors, actively encourage them. Under such circumstances, radical actors 
proliferate as the apparatus of the state decays in a vicious cycle. The second showcases the 
importance of elite patronage and narrow goals to successful radical actors. The Night Riders, 
the radical actors examined there, form a contrast with the third case study, which deals with the 
midwest militia movement. Unlike the Night Riders, the militia movement was characterized by 
a lack of political sophistication, instead motivated by an almost quasi-religious belief in a 
“second American revolution.” This difference plays a key role in the abject failure of the militia 
movement, in contrast to the Night Riders. Before reaching these case studies though, we must 
examine the conditions of unrest under which radical actors thrive.  




The exact relationship between economics and political unrest is subject to much dispute. 
However, the violent episodes this chapter is concerned with can all, to a large extent, be 
explained by James Chowning Davies’ “J-Curve” Theory of Revolutions.334 Sometimes referred 
to as “Revolutions of Rising Expectations”,335 this theory postulates that the key drive of 
political unrest is not suffering per se, but rather a discrepancy between the life people have and 
the life they have (rightly or wrongly) been led to expect. As J.C. Davies notes, “It is the 
dissatisfied state of mind, rather than the tangible provision of ‘adequate’ or ‘inadequate’ 
supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution.”336 As we will show, this 
mechanism does much to describe at least two of the major violent outbursts we will examine. 
The nature and organization of the modern state also make it uniquely suited to acting as 
a target for violent discontent. Misagh Parsa, in Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, 
proposes a model in which popular outrage against the state is directly correlated with the level 
of state intervention in the economy.337 “State intervention in capital accumulation…politicizes 
the markets and economic issues.”338 As Parsa observers, when the government plays a small 
role in economic policies “the state tends to appear autonomous, serving general societal 
interests.”339 But such governments are rare. “In the contemporary capitalist world, all states 
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intervene to varying degrees…the crises of the 1930s…led…to Keynesian demand-
management.” Although his model was intended for the developing world it remains relevant in 
the Global North. In particular, it plays a major role in the third case study, the militia movement 
in the American Midwest.  
Peter Turchins’s Ages of Discord introduces the Structural-Demographic Model, which 
improves and expands upon these earlier theories. The model has three key components. The 
first is “Labor Oversupply…When the supply of labor exceeds its demands, the price of labor 
decreases…leading to popular immiseration but creating favorable economic conditions for the 
elites.340 Second “Elite Overproduction…increasing numbers of elites and elite 
aspirants…exceed the ability of society to sustain them, leading to spiraling intra-elite 
competition and conflict.” 341 The Structural-Demographic model expands on the J-curve theory 
by differentiating between expectations amongst the working class and middle classes and 
expectations amongst elites and near-elites. “Popular Immiseration” in this context simply refers 
to downward social-mobility on the part of the working and middle classes. “Elite aspirants” on 
the other hand, are upwardly-mobile members of society whose ambitions are frustrated by the 
existing sociopolitical structure.  
Turchin cites as examples the “closing of the patriciate” to wealthy plebians in ancient 
Rome342 as well as efforts by the Russian and French monarchies to thin the ranks of the 
aristocracy by forcibly demoting members of the nobility to commoner status.343 Taken 
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individually, neither of these phenomena need be catastrophic. However, when both groups are 
facing a decline, the elite aspirants may mobilize disaffected masses against the elite 
establishment.344 In this respect, Turchin’s structural-demographic crises may be correlated with 
Baumgartner and Jones’ “punctuate equilibria” theory of politics345, in which periodic upheavals 
by policy-entrepreneurs eventually result in the emergence of a new policy consensus.  
Structural Demographic Theory and the American Civil War 
Turchin argues that the Civil War was a product of these dynamics. “Before the Civil War, the 
United States was dominated by the Southern slave-holders in collaboration with Northeastern 
merchants and bankers.”346 Before 1840, political power was effectively consolidated in the 
hands of a small number of elites, who were united in their policy preferences.347 By the mid-
twentieth century, however, the number of upwardly-mobile office-seekers began to overwhelm 
the limited supply of offices available, a competition intensified by the introduction of the 
Jacksonian spoils system.348 These northern elites and elite aspirants resented the influence of 
“Slave Power” over the State.349 Northern elites favored a very different set of policies then the 
Southern slave-holding aristocracy, preferring policies which encouraged industrialization and 
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strengthened manufacturing.350 In other words, they preferred policies which would have 
expanded the number of elite positions available to north-eastern elite-aspirants.  
The growing number of frustrated elite-aspirants led to elite fragmentation351, in which 
many wealthy and politically active northerners became increasingly resentful of the Southern 
Planter-Northern Merchant alliance that had prevailed early in the 19th century. Although many 
northerners increasingly felt that slavery was morally wrong, only a relatively small number of 
committed abolitionists made opposition to slavery a central part of their platform.352 The 
majority tended to resent “Slave Power” more than slavery itself.  
At the same time, there was an explosion of nativist sentiment amongst the working 
classes, who found themselves in labor-market competition with culturally-different new 
arrivals.353 The antebellum era was a period of considerable hardship within the working class. 
From 1844 to 1856, the rate of immigration of unskilled laborers was 950% higher than in the 
1830s; for artisans, the rate was 279%354. Between 1850 and 1860, the demand for poverty relief 
increased by 76%, far outstripping the supply of said relief.355 Per Turchin’s model, this popular 
discontent was redirected by elite political entrepreneurs against the southern slave 
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aristocracy.356 These conditions – a divided elite and the ensuing collapse of the political center – 
would contribute to widespread violence by radical non-state actors in the coming war. 
Radical Violence in the Civil War Era 
The actual outbreak of the Civil War was preceded by a long period of intensifying 
polarization and rising hostility between various non-state actors. In With Ballots and Bullets, 
Nathaniel Kalmoe sketches the partisan battle-lines that had settled firmly into place long before 
the first shot rang out at Ft Sumter. The election of 1856 marked the emergence of a clear split 
between North and South, with the future of slavery clearly eclipsing all other issues in national 
importance.357 When the Confederacy began five years later, a number of Senators and 
representatives abandoned their seats in order to take up positions in the Confederate 
government. Every Senator was a Democrat, as were three-fourths of the representatives.358 
None were Republicans.359 This partisanship would manifest itself in numerous ways. Kalmoe 
finds correlations between community partisanship and rates of enlistment360 and desertion361 
and even in death rates among soldiers in active service.362 
This polarization manifested itself in irregular violence even before the outbreak of the 
war. Most ironically, on the floor of the Senate, Preston Brooks of South Carolina beat Charles 
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Sumner of Massachusetts, while another congressman, Laurence Keitt, held the rest of the Senate 
at gunpoint to prevent them from intervening.363 Perhaps more significant, if less shocking, were 
the outbursts of quasi-organized violence centered on attempts to influence local political 
questions. Kansas, not yet a state, was the site of savage violence between pro- and anti-slavery 
activists, arguably escalating to the level of low-intensity warfare and causing perhaps hundreds 
of deaths.364 
Tennessee provides a good illustration of the kind of partisan fighting that occurred at the 
local level, as chronicled in War At Every Door. Tennessee had a profoundly sectional character, 
with East, Middle, and Central Tennessee each having a distinct regional identity.365 East 
Tennessee had a highly industrialized economy compared to the rest of the state366 and differed 
sharply from the other two regions in their agricultural sector (they grew far less cotton than the 
other regions)367 levels of slave-holding (East Tennessee had far fewer slaves)368 and in their 
levels of wealth (East Tennessee was far poorer).369 Given these differences, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that when Secession came, East Tennessee rejected it by more than two to one.370 
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The region rapidly became a battleground for irregular violent actors. In East Tennessee, 
political, military, and criminal objectives became entangled with each other371, with local 
combatants frequently driven by a combination of personal and ideological motives.372 The scale 
of irregular actions was often striking. Early on, pro-unionist forces more or less spontaneously 
assembled themselves in groups of hundreds or even thousands in anticipation of the war.373 In 
one particularly bold action, a pro-union minister led an operation to destroy five of nine bridges 
which offered the Confederate forces access to East Tennessee.374 Subsequently, the Unionist 
population rose in open revolt against the Confederate government, in hopes that Federal troops 
would arrive to assist them.375 The looked-for troops never arrived, but the uprising forced the 
Confederate government to dispatch six regiments of regular troops to contain the uprising.376 
The situation was aggravated by the involvement of regular violent actors i.e., the Union 
and Confederate militaries. Both Union and Confederate officers condemned partisans as little 
better than bandits; both also worked with irregulars when it seemed convenient.377 Large 
numbers of East Tennesseans fled to join the Union army, with the aid of “pilots,” i.e., 
smugglers.378 These pilots often received varying degrees of aid from the Union military379; with 
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one particularly successful pilot, Daniel Ellis, actually receiving a Captain’s commission in the 
Union Army, at the same time that he acted as a guerilla leader.380 Confederate partisans, 
meanwhile, were sometimes joined by Confederate Cavalry operating from across the border in 
Georgia and North Carolina.381 The Department of the Tennessee was of little strategic 
significance and was perpetually short on military manpower382 which meant that neither 
Confederate nor Union forces could be particularly picky about the conduct of local allies.  
Of note was the inability of political moderates and the apparatus of the state to control 
the local population – even the population that was ostensibly on the state’s side. When the 
Confederates held the territory, they were reluctant to impose stern measures on what they 
believed was a population that had been misled by its leaders.383 As the war went on, this 
indulgent attitude gradually faded,384 but the inconsistency of Confederate policy and their lack 
of resources hindered their ability to combat pro-Union partisans, and left with them with little 
incentive to police pro-Confederacy partisans. Conversely, when the Union forces controlled the 
region, they regarded the population as basically hostile and ruled with a heavy hand.385 
Precisely because of this difference in attitude, they were force to rely extensively on the Home 
Guard – effectively, loyalist partisans with a veneer of official backing. In neither case did the 
apparatus of the state effectively counter irregular violence. Instead, it enabled it. 
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Appeals to moderation by various local leaders were likewise ineffectual. In this, 
Tennessee was a reflection of broader trends within American politics: the collapse of the 
moderate center. By 1862, many Northern Democrats had adopted a stance of supporting the war 
while opposing many of the war’s specific policies.386 This left them suspect in the eyes of 
Republicans, who widely denounced them as putting loyalty to party over loyalty to country for 
their opposition to policies such as emancipation.387 The rhetoric of “country before party” thus 
became a tool to bludgeon opponents rather than a unifying force.388  
The Civil War in East Tennessee demonstrates several striking features. Most 
importantly, as discussed in the introduction, it is a prime example of the circumstances under 
which radical actors thrive. As the war went, neutrality increasingly became an impossibility. 
This in turn made it easier for local elites to mobilize the population into radical paramilitary 
activity, consistent with Gamson’s analysis about the strategic utility of violence. In a climate of 
intense polarization, there was potentially much to gain, and little to lose, from taking the fight to 
the enemy. The center was unable to effectively suppress radical actors and soon much of the 
population decided it was profitable to align with one radical faction or another rather than trying 
to remain aloof from the conflict. 
The conflict was greatly aggravated by the presence of quasi-state actors, in the form of 
the of the Confederate and Union military governments. Critically, these quasi-state actors 
lacked the resources to control the region themselves, and therefore empowered elements of the 
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local population to act on their behalf. The de-facto alliance between elements of the government 
and the paramilitaries weakened the perception that the state was a neutral actor, and further 
eroded norms about the appropriateness of violence as a dispute-resolution tool. Radical actors 
could operate with little fear of repercussion. 
The Black Patch War 
The Black Patch Tobacco War (1906-1909)389 is a far more obscure conflict than the Civil War. 
Like the militia movement that came nearly a century later, the conflict was provoked by the 
economic grievances of small land-owners in an unequal relationship with a vertically-integrated 
purchasing agent. Beginning in around 1890, the American Tobacco Company began to establish 
a near-monopoly of the tobacco market. The ATC either purchased or drove out of business an 
estimated 250 independent businesses.390 The ATC divided tobacco-producing territories into 
districts, with each district assigned to a single buyer.391 Tobacco farmers in turn could take 
whatever price the buyer offered or take nothing at all. So deeply-rooted were these monopolistic 
practices that in one case, a tobacco buyer reportedly refused to cross the road to look at another 
part of the farmers crop, saying that the other side of the road was outside his allotted territory.392 
By the beginning of the 20th century, the “Duke Trust” (so called for its owner James Duke) 
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controlled an estimated 82% of the country’s Tobacco market.393 The results were predictable. 
Under Duke’s policies, the price-per-pound of Tobacco for farmers dropped from 6 cents in 1900 
to 2 to 3 cents in 1904.394  
The farmers responded by forming their own cooperative and collective bargaining 
instruments.  These efforts were merely the latest in a long of attempts by independent farmers to 
alleviate their position. In 1870, the Greenback-Labor party had formed in response to the “crop-
lien” system, in which cash-strapped farmers were forced to grow cash-crops in order get credit 
from local lenders.395 The Greenback-Labor party advocated for an expansion of the money 
supply in order to alleviate the pressure on farmers; although they had little success, what 
success they enjoyed was overwhelmingly concentrated in the “Black Patch” region, the 
heartland of crop-lien and debt-bondage.396 This was followed by the Grangers, who attempted 
to buy farm goods in bulk and manufacture cheap fertilizer for local farmers.397 By 1878, the 
Grangers had collapsed under pressure from local merchants, who embargoed commerce with 
the organization.398 The failure of these efforts persuaded agrarian activists that the best way to 
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level the playing field was the creation of “sub-treasuries” which could offer low-credit loans to 
farmers, alleviating their credit crunch and allowing them to hold out for higher prices.399 
In 1888, Tobacco farmers had formed the “Tobacco Congress”400 as a subset of the larger 
“Wheel and Alliance” agricultural populist movement.401 By this time, populism had become a 
truly nationwide force, with Democratic and Republican candidates forced to address the issues 
it brought to the forefront402 and prominent spokesmen from national-level organizations 
observing events in the region.403 Campaigning as a third party, the populists would elect a 
governor, fifteen state senators, and fifty-two lower-house representatives in Kentucky and 
Tennessee by 1891.404 The sense of agency local farmers derived from participating in these 
movements would play a critical role in the establishment of later cooperative organizations.405 
The rise of populism across the United States was inadequate to prevent the Duke Trust’s 
growing stranglehold on the tobacco industry and tobacco planters throughout the Black Patch 
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region.406  Armed with their previous experience, the tobacco farmers of the Black Patch came 
together to form the Tobacco Growers Association (the group that would later become the 
Protective Planters Association) in 1901.407 Notably, the Grower’s association first cultivated 
support from local elites. At the initial meeting, one farmer observed that local banks stood to 
lose as much as the farmers did from the ATC’s monopolistic tactics, given the region’s 
economic dependence on Tobacco.408 This alliance with local elites was reflected in the 
organization’s composition. Founding member John M. Foster was trained as a lawyer at 
Vanderbilt University before becoming a farmer409, while later leader Felix Ewing owned 260 
acres, making him extraordinarily wealthy by regional standards.410 The alliance was also 
reflected in the organizations policy. As Tracy Campbell observed, under Ewing’s leadership, 
the organization shunned larger systemic issues of “politics, the money system of the country, 
and other diverse things” and kept “but one end in view, the better price of tobacco.”411 This 
narrow focus stood in sharp distinction to the earlier efforts to bypass the banks by creating “sub-
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treasuries”, and it bore fruit: as many as 32 local bankers gave financial support to the 
Association.412  
The Duke Trust responded to these efforts by attempting to bypass the collective 
bargaining apparatus. They began offering preferable rates to those farmers who refused to join 
the association413 The farmers in turn began applying pressure to “hillbillies” who refused to join 
the grower’s association.414 The methods of persuasion were at first non-violent; boycotts of 
merchants who spoke against the growers association, walkouts by parishioners on pastors who 
spoke against the group.415 The group publicly maintained a non-violent stance, and gained, by 
some estimates, about 70% of the Black Patch farmers.416 The boycott strategy, however, relied 
on transforming the conflict into a war of economic attrition, one which the Duke Trust, with its 
vast financial reserves, was considerably better-equipped to endure than the cash-strapped 
farmers. Soon, the methods of friendly persuasion would turn to violence. 
“The Silent Brigade”, also called ‘night riders’ was never proven to be an arm of the 
PPA, who disavowed them while expressing sympathy for their goals.417 They began by 
targeting not people, but crops, destroying plants and infrastructure of non-association 
members.418 Simple acts like salting the fields419 of anti-association farmers were not particularly 
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dramatic, but they were potentially ruinous for independent farmers operating on the economic 
knife-edge. More spectacularly, the Night Riders began attacking warehouses and destroying 
stockpiles of merchants who opposed the trust. In one instance, they seem to have destroyed two 
warehouses in separate counties on the same day, burning down one and dynamiting the other.420 
The fact that the second warehouse was owned by a Baptist seminary421 gives some indication of 
how far the Night Riders were willing to go in pursuit of their goals.  
Intimidation and violence against persons followed soon enough. A typical case was that 
of Joe Bennett, a relatively wealthy businessman who was beaten “until he couldn’t get his 
breath…they was like to kill him.”422 The intimidation was not confined simply to local actors. 
In one particularly memorable instance, a New York merchant associated with the Duke Trust 
cabled his employer “Arrived Hopkinsville midnight – checked into hotel at one – Night Riders 
filled room with bullets at two – I quit.423 At the height of their influence, the Night Ridders 
launched raids into the towns served as commercial hubs – Princeton, Hopkinsville, and 
Russellville - for the Tobacco industry, holding police at gunpoint and destroying critical assets 
and infrastructure.424  
The most striking thing about the Night Riders is the extent to which they were 
successful. Dr David Amoss, widely believed to have been the leader of the Night Riders, was 
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acquitted by a jury after his arrest.425 By 1909, the price of tobacco had risen enough for farmers 
to gain a measure of fiscal stability426, returning to eight cents a pound, approximately the levels 
they had been prior to the Duke Monopoly.427 And in 1910, the American Tobacco company was 
broken up by the Supreme Court, under the auspices of the Anti-Trust Act.428  
Examining the record, there seem to be several reasons for the Night Rider’s (relative) 
success in employing violence as a political instrument. First, consistent with Gamson’s theory, 
there was widespread support for their cause, if not their specific tactics. The Planter’s Protective 
Alliance was widely supported by many Black Patch residents, even without the coercive tactics 
employed by the Nigh Riders. Critically, the use of violence does not seem to have alienated 
anyone who already meaningfully supported the PPA. Insofar as their intimidation tactics had an 
effect, they seem to have only strengthened the PPAs support base. Moreover, their campaign 
took place in the midst of larger nation-wide pushback against Gilded-Age plutocrats, as 
evidenced by the Supreme Court’s ruling against American Tobacco. The Night Riders were 
swimming with the tide, not against it. Equally important was the involvement of local elites, 
who provided organizational capital and a persuasive public face for the organization, 
championing their cause in the press and in the political arena. Lastly, they had a keen 
understanding of their strategic position vis-à-vis their opponents. They kept their focus on 
narrow, tactically-achievable goals, and concentrated on hitting their enemy where they were 
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most vulnerable. In all these respects, they formed a striking contrast with the mid-western 
militia movement that would appear nearly a century later.  
 
Rage in the Midwest 
The destruction of the Alfred P Murrah Building in 1995 in Oklahoma City was one of 
the deadliest terrorist attacks on American soil.429 It killed 168 people and drew the attention of 
media observers and governmental figures across the nation.430  As the militia movement entered 
the public discourse, it was common to draw comparisons with previous right-wing militant 
groups like the Klu Klux Klan. But this is a somewhat misleading comparison because the Klan 
was largely focused on maintaining control of local power structures in the face of 
Reconstruction by intimidation and violence.431 The targets of the Klan’s violence was usually 
their newly-freed neighbors or agents of reconstruction.432  
By contrast, the militia movement of the 1990s was rooted in the socioeconomic 
conditions of the rural Midwest433 and lacked the political and organizational savvy of the Klan. 
There was a deeply racial component to the rhetoric and logic of the militia movement, 
particularly among its most high-profile spokesmen.434 But within midwestern communities, this 
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racial rhetoric was by necessity, largely abstract. The Black population is far lower in the 
Midwest than the in the South, and is more often concentrated in urban areas435 rather than farm 
communities. Likewise, the National Jewish Population Survey estimated that at the turn of the 
millennium, the Jewish community in the Midwest was actually the smallest of all major regions 
in the country.436 Thus the militia movement did not have a concrete local target in the form of a 
distinct population that could be subjected to a violent pressure campaign. The violence of the 
militia movement was more often focused on highly symbolic rather than practical targets. 
By comparison with their Black Patch predecessors, the militia wave of the 1990s was far 
less organized and sophisticated. It was a product of socioeconomic decline in the American 
heartland.437 In the 1970s, the Department of Agriculture, along with private and government 
lenders, pushed a policy of “get big or get out.”438 An expansionary boom ensued as large 
volumes of easy money entered the market. This expansionary boom abruptly collapsed when 
the Federal Reserve decided to curtail inflation by raising interest rates.439 As a result, numerous 
small and mid-size farmers suddenly had to pay ever-higher interest rates at the same time that 
the value of their land was plummeting.440  
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The economic pressure on small farmers was intensified by a trend towards 
unprecedented consolidation in the agricultural industry.441 Reporter Joel Dyer uses the example 
of a hypothetical farmer Jones who, over the course of a year pays out to fifteen different 
companies for various critical supplies and services: seed, animal feed, sprinkler equipment, 
insurance, shipping and storage for his products.442 In fact, all of these companies are owned by a 
single multinational corporation.443 “The companies own banks, investment firms, insurance 
companies, steel companies, chemical companies, and lumber companies. They are the buyers of 
the farmers products as well as the processors of those products.”444 As a result of their lack of 
bargaining power, the small farmers were forced to take whatever price these multinational 
conglomerates offered for their crops. Usually, what they offered was not enough to keep afloat 
financially. At the peak of the farm crisis, approximately a million people were forced off their 
family farms in a twelve-month period.445 
This in turn led to a mental health crisis within rural communities. Farmers, faced with 
the collapse of their way of life and the loss of land that had been in their family for, in some 
cases, generations, grew despondent and at times violent. One researcher at the University of 
Oklahoma found that in 1989, suicide surpassed equipment accidents as the leading cause of 
death on family farms.446 An Iowa study found that rural child abuse increased by 43.6% from 
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1982 to 1986.447 Given the centrality of agriculture to many small rural towns, the effects were 
not limited to the farmers themselves, but swallowed whole communities. “Traditional role 
models such as Sunday-school teachers, physicians, baseball coaches, and doctors, have all but 
disappeared as small towns have been boarded up as a result of the failing economy.”448 
Thus, by the late 1980s, the rural Midwest was filled with large numbers of desperate 
farm-owners and their only slightly-less unsettled neighbors. Some of these men turned their 
desperation and anger on themselves or their families. Others, however, directed their anger at 
the United States government (perhaps more accurately, their own conspiratorial imagining of 
the United States government). In the words of one of Dyer’s informants “When these [anti-
government] groups come along and tell a struggling person…it’s the governments 
fault…They’re offering them the hope that the system can’t or wont.”449 What is most striking 
about the strategy these radical actors adopted however, is its relative lack of political 
sophistication. 
Dyer uses a farmer named Gideon Cowan as a case study in the process of radicalization. 
In 1990, Gideon Cowan’s farm was confiscated and his equipment sold at auction.450 In the 
course of trying to keep his farm, Cowan sued a local banker.451 The judge ruled that the banker 
was liable for fraud – but that the bank still had the right to foreclose on Cowan’s farm.452 
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Cowan’s family lacked the money to pay lawyers to continue contesting the case.453 Cowan 
subsequently became involved in the anti-government movement, associating with groups that 
argued the plight of Cowan and his neighbors was due to a nebulous conspiracy of wealthy 
Jews.454 More to the point, as far as Cowan was concerned, these groups offered a legal remedy 
by which he could reclaim his farm.455 
When Cowan attempted to file a lien against the bank which had foreclosed on his farm, 
however, he was arrested for filing false documents.456 He was sentenced to eight years in 
prison.457 He succeeded in raising an $80,000 appeal bond through the aid of fellow farmers.458 
This reprieve was only short-lived, however. On the day he was supposed to file his appeal, he 
was told that he required a transcript of his previous trial – something which would cost $700.459 
Unable to come up with the money on short notice, Cowan became a fugitive until he was 
arrested in Oklahoma City in 1996.460 At the time of Dyer’s interview, he was still in prison. 
From a sociological perspective, it does not matter that Cowan’s trial was presumably 
conducted according to the letter of the law. Nor does it matter that the lien he filed in an effort 
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to get his farm back – vaguely described as having to do with the Uniform Commercial Code461 - 
was probably nonsense. In Cowan’s mind, and in the minds of his friends and supporters – the 
system was rigged against him. He did everything he thought was supposed to, and he lost his 
land, his family, and his freedom. They have a sense that they have exhausted all peaceful 
avenues of redress, and that their complaints have not, and will not, be heard by those in 
authority. These attitudes were widespread among rural communities at the time. Dyer cites a 
sociologist, Bill Heffernan, who observed a series of interactions between bankers, ranchers 
(likewise facing many of the same economic pressures as the farmers) and agribusiness 
representatives in North Dakota. Heffernan’s analysis was grim: “The bankers and government 
officials just didn’t get it. With the level of community depression in North Dakota right now, I’d 
estimate we’re maybe a year and a half away from a serious shooting war up there.”462 
It is striking that Misagh Parsa, writing of events on a different continent (the Iranian 
Revolution) described a similar phenomena “Government intervention to improve the agrarian 
sector has benefited large, rich producers at the expense of small cultivators…investment 
policies have widened the gap between regions…the overall result has been a high level of 
economic polarization…with the politicization of the market, victimized collectives can more 
readily identify the state as the source of their suffering.”463  
The militia movements lack of success stands in stark contrast to the Black Patch 
predecessors. The Night Riders enjoyed a degree of success; the militia movement had little to 
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none. The consolidation of the agricultural sector proceeds apace.464  The difference in outcomes 
is arguably a result of differences in goals and organization. For the Riders, violence was one 
component of a unified political strategy in pursuit of a specific goal. But the militia movement, 
as demonstrated by Gideon Cowan, lacked the political and legal understanding to prosecute an 
integrated pressure campaign. Their plan, such as it was, was to trigger an apocalyptic war in 
which numerous small independent groups would eventually overthrow the government465 This 
strategy of “leaderless resistance”466 has gone on to influence many groups with widely different 
agendas and origins.467 To be sure, more-or-less spontaneous mass movements, such as the Arab 
Spring468, have been known effect major political changes. But such movements are, by their 
very nature, unpredictable and often impossible to control. The militia movement’s faith in a sort 
of Second American Revolution betrays a strong element of political millenarianism in their 
thinking.469470 In this respect, the militia movement displayed an almost striking level of naivete 
about the nature of political change. The Night Rider’s connections to local elites and laser focus 
on pressuring vulnerable actors within the local polity stands in sharp contrast to the apocalyptic 
visions that led Timothy McVeigh to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah building. 
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Several conclusions may be drawn from these case studies. The first is that radical actors 
seem to thrive in an environment with both deep-seated partisan cleavages and frustrated socio-
economic expectations. The Black Patch War and the militia movement were both driven by 
specific and easily-identifiable economic grievances. The violence in East Tennessee is less easy 
to pin to a specific set of economic complaints, enmeshed as it is within the larger historical 
phenomena of the American Civil War – but Turchin’s analysis suggests that those larger 
phenomena were themselves intimately related to socio-economic grievances. The war in East 
Tennessee was so fraught precisely because it amplified pre-existing sectional tensions between 
those enmeshed within the agrarian aristocracy and those outside of it. In each case, larger 
economic trends – industrialization, agricultural consolidation, etcetera – created a population 
ready and willing to mobilize aggressively against perceived enemies.  
The intensity of partisanship was in some measure, an indication of how widespread 
these socio-economic frustrations were. In the case of the Black Patch War and the militia 
movement, these grievances were confined to a relatively small sector of the population. In the 
case of the civil war, these grievances were felt across the nation. Equally critically, these 
cleavages were distributed not only horizontally – people all across the country felt strongly 
about the future of the union – but vertically. People at every level of society were passionate 
about the issue. Violence resulting from grievances confined mostly to the bottom layer of 
society looks very different from the violence of a full-on civil war – more perhaps, like the 
incidents of strike-breaking that occurred during the Gilded Age period. When elite/near-elite 





The second point is that a divided elite and attendant state weakness exacerbate popular 
radicalization in a positive feedback loop. When there is consensus among highly-visible 
politicians and office-holders about norms of conduct and behavior, political disputes are 
contained within institutional channels. Elections are held, issues are debated, policies are 
decided according to the normal process. But when elites begin to abandon normal channels, this 
accelerates unrest in two ways. Firstly, it creates a legitimation crisis, in which the perception 
that “normal channels” are inadequate to address the current situation grows ever more 
widespread. Bad faith about the political process feeds on itself; every faction can point to 
another faction’s violation of institutional norms as justification for its own behavior.  
Additionally, elite division contributes to state paralysis. This in turn leads whoever holds 
the state to look beyond the state for support. As seen in East Tennessee, both Union and 
Confederate forces, lacking the resources to control the population, turned to whatever segment 
of society was the most sympathetic to their agenda. Neither Union nor Confederate forces were 
favorably inclined towards paramilitary organizations, but neither could afford to do without 
them. This further intensified the legitimation crisis, alienating whatever segment of the 
population was opposed to the current government. It also contributed to the infiltration of 
radical groups of the state apparatus, perhaps in some cases making nominally impartial officials 
in some sense dependent on their more radical supports, undermining their ability to de-escalate 
the situation.  
The third major point is that groups which employ violence are more likely to be 
successful if their aims are relatively narrow, if they have some degree of support from local 
elites, and if they apply violence selectively. The militia movement was characterized by a 




Murrah building did no more to bring down the established socio-political order than the 
destruction of the World Trade center did less than a decade later. The developed nation-state 
remains, on the whole, a robust form of organization, largely impervious to frontal assault by 
anything other than another nation-state. A frontal assault serves only to invite a devastating 
response.  
On the other hand, selective violence can tip the balance in cases where the forces 
arrayed on either side of an issue are relatively equal, by pressuring those actors at the margins 
who are most vulnerable. In the case of the Black Patch war, there was already considerable 
pressure on the Duke Tobacco company, both as a result of the anti-trust sentiment sweeping the 
country and from the growing political consciousness of residents of the Black Patch region. 
“Actors at the margins” in this case meant small planters and middle-class merchants who sought 
to cut their own deal with the Duke Company, commercial buyers afraid for their personal 
safety, etc. In such cases, violence may well prove a useful tool for political actors.  
The role of radical violence in American political history is often a contentious topic, and 
is likely to remain so. A survey of the historical record, however, suggests that it is more 
common than sometimes assumed, and indeed may play a more central role than we give it credit 
for. Under certain political and economic conditions – a divided center, widespread popular 
discontent, and competitive elites willing to patronize radical actors – it is likely to be an 




















Conclusion: Radical Actors in Contemporary American Politics 
The previous chapters discussed three different aspects of Radical-Center interaction in 
American politics: how radicals resist changes at the center, what makes them cooperate with 
more mainstream actors, and what allows them to succeed. It remains to apply this model to the 
contemporary political landscape. A key component of this framework is that these modes of 
interaction are not mutually exclusive. Political actors can shift their position over time and can 
operate in different modes in relation to different actors. The previous chapter, discussed the 
sociodemographic factors which allow confrontational radicalism to flourish: elite competition 
and a weak and divided political center. An examination of recent political history through the 




States is entering a period of institutional crisis, in which radicalism may become more 
prevalent. This is not, however, a suggestion that a renewed Civil War is imminent. On the 
contrary, it is more likely that radicalism will take the form of tactical alliances-of-convenience 
between different actors. The key lesson of the third chapter was that radical actors are most 
effective when they have narrowly defined goals and are linked with political elites. It is 
precisely this form that radicalism is most likely to take in the near future. 
Intensification of Elite Competition 
Turchin’s analysis suggests that the United States is moving through a disintegrative 
phase,471 i.e., a period of heightened social and political upheaval.  Using data from the Cross-
National Time Series database, Turchin identifies a sharp increase in both non-violent protests 
and violent outbursts, beginning in 2010 after several decades in which such demonstrations 
remained stable or declined.472 According to his model, this apparent increase in political unrest 
is not simply the result of various proximate causes – the growth of social media473, the uniquely 
idiosyncratic leadership style of Donald Trump,474 etc. Rather, “until the fundamental SD drivers 
for instability are reversed, there will be other triggering events.”475  
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The first of Turchin’s criteria that can now be evaluated based on the findings of this case 
studies analyzed in the previous chapters is elite competition. This may be measured in several 
ways. Turchin himself uses the ROI of a law degree, pointing out the large number of lawyers in 
Congress476 and arguing that law school students may be thought of as upwardly-mobile “elite 
aspirants”. Statistics from the American Bar Association reveal a bimodal distribution to new 
lawyers starting salaries, with some making $160,000 annually, and many more making $40-
60,000.477 Given the considerable time spent and debt incurred to pursue a law degree, these low-
earning lawyers may be thought of as failed elite-aspirants.478 This bimodal salary distribution 
also echoes the split between high-earning and low-earning college students discussed above. 
Another possible measure of intra-elite competition may be college admissions. A 
handful of Ivy-League Universities are widely considered to be the most prestigious479, and 
produce a disproportionately high number of Supreme Court justices480 and government 
officials.481 Competition for places at these schools is fierce, with applicants being admitted at 
rate of around 6.5%.482 More importantly, these schools have become more competitive over the 
past several decades.483 The acceptance rate at Stanford, for instance, declined from 19.3% to 4% 
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from 1990 to 2019.484 Columbia’s acceptance rate declined even more dramatically, from 32.3% 
to 5.1%.485 These schools have gotten so much more competitive because the number of places 
available has not grown in proportion to the rising numbers of applicants.486 A comparison of the 
undergraduate student population at Ivy-League schools in 1986487 with contemporary class sizes 
suggests that they have remained virtually unchanged for decades. In 1976, for example, Yale 
had an undergraduate population of just over 5000488; today it has a population of just under 
5000.489 Meanwhile, it had just under 10,000 applicants in 1976490; in 2021 it received a little 
over 46,000 applicants.491 Insofar as Yale is an elite school, we can assess that the competition 
for elite status has gotten significantly more intense. 
Another useful proxy for elite competition may be elections. In a society where 
established elites were relatively secure, we would expect incumbent politicians to be re-elected 
by a comfortable margin. Likewise, we would expect the cost of political campaigns to remain 
relatively stable, increasing no more than the rate of inflation. But this is not the case in the 
United States. As of 2021, the margins of victory for both Senate and House elections were 
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lower than in any year since 2012.492 Three House races were decided by less than 500 votes.493 
At the same time, election spending has increased dramatically. The 2020 election cycle was the 
most expensive in history, by a staggering 14.6 billion dollars, more than in the previous two 
presidential election cycles combined.494 Much of the spending increase was concentrated in the 
Presidential election, perhaps unsurprising considering the uniquely polarizing style of Donald 
Trump.495 But there was a nearly-equal growth in congressional election spending, suggesting 
that the increase cannot be attributed to Trump alone.496  
Taken together, this data suggest an intensified struggle for political office among elites 
and elite-aspirants. This intensified struggle is not in and of itself a guarantee of an increasing 
confrontation between radicals and the center. It does, however, make it more likely. 
“Entrepreneurial” elites, denied easy access to the apparatus of the state, are more likely to form 
tactical alliances with radical actors in pursuit of their personal and policy goals. Intensified elite 
competition also makes it more difficult for the state to act effectively against radical actors. 
Entrepreneurial elites are reluctant to take action which might alienate their supporters, and are 
likely to distance themselves from, or actively hinder these efforts. At the same time, as 
demonstrated by the relationship both Union and Confederate governments formed with 
paramilitary groups in East Tennessee, a state stretched to the limit of its resources is likely to 
take help wherever it can. “Wherever it can” differs depending on who currently holds the reigns 
of the state, but the pattern of enabling radical actors persists. In other words, such a situation 
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makes it more likely that radical groups will operate in a cooperative mode with select elites and 
elite aspirants, while simultaneously operating in the confrontational mode against other elites 
and the state itself. The evidence for this trend is discussed later in this chapter. 
Popular Immiseration and Reactive Radicalism 
Another major criteria for Turchin is “popular immiseration”, i.e., declining standards of 
living amongst the majority of the population.497 Upward economic mobility in the United States 
has declined sharply since the middle of the twentieth century; middle-class people born after 
1980 have only a 45% chance of out-earning their parents, compared to 81% for those born a 
generation earlier.498 Real wages have remained essentially stagnant for nearly half-a-century.499 
What wage growth has occurred has been concentrated amongst the upper echelons of the 
working population; workers without college degrees have actually had their wages decrease 
since 1979.500 Even for college graduates, most wage increases have accrued to the top 90th 
percentile, i.e., the most highly-earning college graduates earn substantially more than their 
lowest-earning co-graduates.501  As measured by the Gini coefficient, the United States has the 
highest wealth inequality of any G7 country.502  
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The Covid-19 pandemic has aggravated pre-existing class tensions within the country.503 
For most middle-class professionals, working from home is an inconvenience. For many blue-
collar workers, it is simply not an option. Adherence to social distancing guidelines corresponds 
closely with income levels, with lower-income groups being less likely to adhere.504 
Ethnographers observing footage of anti-lockdown protests observed that protesters frequently 
complained about the lack of work.505 It is estimated that the hardest-hit sectors of the economy 
are precisely those which are the lowest-paying.506 Employees in low and middle-wages jobs 
were significantly more likely to face layoffs than those in high-paying sectors.507 Thus the 
“popular immiseration” Turchin described has worsened.  
Legitimacy and Violence 
There is also evidence that Americans are becoming increasingly willingly to support the 
use of violence as a political instrument. According to a poll conducted by the (right-leaning) 
American Enterprise Institute, just over a third of the country feels “The traditional American 
way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.”508 Support for 
violence was significantly higher among Republicans (39%), but a significant minority (17%) of 
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Democrats agreed with the statement “If elected leaders will not protect America, the people 
must do it themselves even if it requires taking violent actions.”509 This suggests that the Mass 
Mobilization Potential of the country – Turchin’s measure of the general populations’ 
willingness to militate against the state – seems to be quite high. Another data point in favor of 
this interpretation comes from the range of participants in the Capitol Hill insurrection. An initial 
survey by the University of Georgetown suggested that the largest category of participants were 
not those with pre-existing ties to radical organizations, but rather “inspired believers” who more 
or less spontaneously answered the call to “stop the steal.”510 Those with pre-existing ties to 
radical groups may have played a disproportionate role in spurring the group to violent 
action,511but they seem to have found a ready audience. In many respects, the range of 
participants were notable for how representing a broad cross-section of society, confounding 
many conventional images of the “typical” participant in political upheavals. 512 In short, the 
intense partisan cleavages that figured prominently in the last chapter are once again in evidence.  
Equally concerning is the prospect that elites and elite-aspirants may be come willing to 
tacitly condone the use of violence as a political tool. As discussed in the case of the militia 
movement, the decision to use violence was a preceded by a rejection of the legitimacy of 
established institutions of government. In the case of the militia movement, this rejection was 
cast in somewhat bizarre legalistic rhetoric that was largely opaque to anyone outside the 
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movement. But the logic or lack thereof of a group’s decision to reject the legitimacy of 
governing institutions is not the point. The point is simply that they do reject their legitimacy. 
This rejection may not be in and of itself a call for violence. But it can easily become that, or be 
interpreted as that by the general public. 
Most obvious of course is then-President Trumps refusal to accept the results of the 2020 
election.513 So vehement were his denials and his assertions of fraud that some have alleged they 
constituted an incitement to riot514 (though the Senate ultimately rejected this allegation).515 
Trump’s allegations are noteworthy for their brazenness and their absurdity,516 something which 
makes them easy to dismiss as the conspiratorial ravings of a demagogue. But other, subtler 
rejections of institutional legitimacy have proliferated in recent years. Former presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton517 called Trump an “illegitimate” president and blamed “weaponized 
false information”,518 while former President Jimmy Carter said “[Russian] interference…if fully 
investigated would show that Trump didn’t actually win the election.”519 A poll early in Trump’s 
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presidency suggested that a majority of American’s actually viewed him as illegitimate.520 
Indeed, one analysis suggests that the last five presidents have all been plagued by allegations of 
illegitimacy to varying degrees.521  
Trump’s rhetoric has been uniquely strident and inflammatory, and has had uniquely 
disruptive results. But the attitudes he espouses are subtly becoming normalized amongst a broad 
segment of the population. The substance of these accusations differ on each side of the aisle. It 
is harder to disprove the claim that Russian information operations influenced the election or that 
election laws have unfairly suppressed minority voters522 than it is to disprove the assertions of 
massive voter fraud.523 But for purposes of socio-political dynamics, the relative probability of 
each side’s claims is irrelevant. All that matters is the growing perception of illegitimacy is 
widespread.  
Also of concern is the idea that elements of the state may actually be collaborating with 
extremist elements. A number of police officers have been charged with participation in the 
capitol riots.524 A disproportionate number of those arrested are military veterans, approximately 
12%.525 Some members of Congress have actually alleged that the rioters were supported by 
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other members of Congress or by congressional staffers.526 It is difficult to fully evaluate the 
veracity of such claims, in part because Republican members of Congress have actually blocked 
efforts to create an investigative committee.527 As discussed above, divisions in the center have 
limited the state’s ability to act strongly against potential threats.  
The New Normal? 
If we are entering a legitimacy crisis, where violence seems to be a legitimate tactic for 
both the masses and the elites, what form will this violence likely take? To understand this we 
should refer once more to the previous chapter. As established there, violence is most likely to be 
successful when employed tactically rather than strategically, in pursuit of limited goals with the 
support of local elites. The Capitol Riot, and the ongoing political and legal reaction to it, 
represents the failure of frontal assault on the state as a strategy. The election was obviously not 
overturned, and participants faced severe penalties. Trump himself has taken steps to distance 
himself from the event.528 The assault on democracy was simply too high-profile to go 
unanswered, even by those who stood to benefit from it. 
However, this does not mean that competitive elites or disaffected masses will 
spontaneously renew their belief in the procedural norms of American democracy and firmly 
renounce violence as a tool. It does mean that they will likely be drawn to subtler and more 
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carefully targeted forms of violence. For example, one can imagine armed paramilitary or law 
enforcement officials intimidating voters at polling places,529as has happened in the past.530  
Alternatively, one could imagine a violent pressure campaign directed against key 
officials in an effort to nullify a disliked policy. Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic public 
health officials were frequently subject to threats and harassment while at the same time elected 
officials debated the extent of decision-making power to delegate to administrative agencies.531 
There have been no published studies about the extent to which these threats affected the 
administration of Covid-19 pandemic response restrictions. But it is conceivable that at a state or 
county level, an effectively-coordinated pressure campaign could have significantly impeded 
effective implementation, particularly in a locale where public health officials lacked support 
from elected leaders. In such a case, violent intimidation becomes one more “thumb on the 
scales,” tipping the balance of power in one way or another. It is conceivable that sufficiently 
competitive elites could resort to such tactics with increasing frequency. 
How could this tendency be mitigated? Elites could renounce these tactics of course, but 
if Turchin’s analysis has any validity, it suggests that they are unlikely to do so. Elites, like other 
demographic groups, respond to incentives, and the current incentive structure – high degrees of 
intra-elite competition, a divided center unable to counter radicals effectively, and a large 
population of disaffected potential recruits – gives them little reason to do so. An alternative 
strategy might be to pursue a policy of decentralization, “lowering the stakes” of political 
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competition. The rise of so-called “Sanctuary cities”,532 calls for “Blue Exit”,533 and “Calexit”534 
on the left, and the rise of “Second Amendment” sanctuaries on the right535 are both examples of 
lower-level political units attempting to go their own way in spite of their de jure and de facto 
subordination to higher levels of government. In a similar vein, no less a figure than Supreme 
court Justice Clarence Thomas has recently criticized the legal ambiguity surrounding cannabis 
as a result of contradictory state and Federal policies.536 
Such a policy would require sacrifice on the part of elite “winners”. As a general rule, the 
victors in a hard-fought contest are not inclined to share the fruits of their victory. If current 
trends continue, the struggle for political office will remain increasingly hard-fought, and those 
who succeed may be reluctant to share power. But such a policy could do much to mitigate the 
intensity of intra-elite struggles, by providing alternative avenues of advancement for failed elite-
aspirants. It might also mitigate the reactive trends which appear to drive mass-mobilization 




“A National Emergency: How COVID-19 Is Fueling Unrest in the US | ACLED,” Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project, March 4, 2021, https://acleddata.com/2021/03/04/a-
national-emergency-how-covid-19-is-fueling-unrest-in-the-us/. 
 
                                                          
532 Loren Collingwood, “The Rise of Sanctuary Cities in the United States | Nccr – on the Move,” nccr-
onthemove.ch, January 23, 2020, https://nccr-onthemove.ch/blog/the-rise-of-sanctuary-cities-in-the-united-states/. 
533 Kevin Baker, “It’s Time for a Bluexit,” The New Republic, March 9, 2017, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/140948/bluexit-blue-states-exit-trump-red-america. 
534 Jeff Daniels, “The ‘Calexit’ Plan to Split California from the US Gets a Second Chance, While Others Are 
Looking to Break up the State,” CNBC (CNBC, April 24, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/24/calexit-plan-to-
divorce-california-from-us-is-getting-a-second-chance.html. 
535 BETHANY BLANKLEY Square The Center, “61% of US Counties Now ‘Second Amendment Sanctuaries,’” 
KTBS, July 5, 2021, https://www.ktbs.com/news/louisiana/61-of-us-counties-now-second-amendment-
sanctuaries/article_614f39b6-843d-513e-aff2-73689b85b02b.html. 





“Capitol Riot Death Toll Rises to 5; Police Hunt for Suspects.” 2021. NBC4 Washington. 









“Ivy League Rankings 2021: The Definitive Guide,” Shemmassian Academic Consulting, 2021, 
https://www.shemmassianconsulting.com/blog/ivy-league-rankings. 
 
“Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the Election 




“National Jewish Population Survey 2000-01 Jews in the Midwest a United Jewish Communities 
Presentation of Findings.” n.d. Accessed February 27, 2021. 
https://www.jewishdatabank.org/content/upload/bjdb/307/NJPS2000_Jews_in_the_Midwest.pdf. 
 
“Program on Extremism ‘This Is Our House!’ a Preliminary Assessment of the Capitol Hill 
Siege Participants” (, 2021), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/This-Is-Our-
House.pdf. Page 18 
 
“Refuting the Myth of Voter Fraud yet Again | Brennan Center for Justice,” 
www.brennancenter.org, January 6, 2021, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/refuting-myth-voter-fraud-yet-again. 
 
“Student Enrollments in the Ivy League and MIT, 1986-199” (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Office of Institutional Research, June 8, 1999). 
 
“Summary of Yale College Admissions Class of 1980 to Class of 2022,” Yale.Edu (Yale Office 
of Institutional Research, January 7, 2019), 
https://oir.yale.edu/sites/default/files/w033_fresh_admissions.pdf. 
 
“The ‘Revolution of Rising Expectations,’ Relative Deprivation, and the Urban Social Disorders 
of the 1960s.” 2005. Social Science History 29 (2): 299–332. doi:10.1017/S0145553200012967. 
 
“U.S. Reports: United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).,” Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, 1910, https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep221106/ 
“Voters Should Not Be Intimidated | Brennan Center for Justice,” www.brennancenter.org, 






“Where Supreme Court Justices Earned Law Degrees,” WTOP, November 5, 2020, 
https://wtop.com/news/2020/11/where-supreme-court-justices-earned-law-degrees/. 
“Yale Facts,” Yale University, August 3, 2015, https://www.yale.edu/about-yale/yale-facts. 
1615 L. St NW, Suite 800Washington, and DC 20036USA202-419-4300 | Main202-857-8562 | 
Fax202-419-4372 | Media Inquiries, “U.S. Has Highest Level of Income Inequality among G7 




Abramson Alana. “’I Can’t Help You Anymore Being a Democrat’ West Virginia Governor 
Switches Parties at Trump Rally.” Time.Com. (August 2017), 63 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=124460631&site=ehost-
live&scope=site 
Al Ibrahim, Daleen, and Yibin Shi. “The Symbiotic Relationship between Media and Terrorism 
from the Past to the Present.” China Media Research, vol. 15, no. 2, Apr. 2019, pp. 61–67. 
EBSCOhost, 
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ufh&AN=136213035&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. Page 62 
 
Amelia Davidson 7:05 pm, Apr 06, and 2021, “Yale’s Acceptance Rate Drops to 4.62 Percent 




Anderson, Joshua. “A Tension in the Political Thought of Huey P. Newton.” Journal of African 
American Studies 16, no. 2 (June 2012): 249–67. doi:10.1007/s12111-011-9207-9.  
 
Andreouli, Eleni, and Cathy Nicholson.“Brexit and Everyday Politics: An Analysis of Focus-
Group Data on the EU Referendum.” Poltical Psychology 39 (6) (2018): 1323-38 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=69.5067&site=ehost-
live&scope=site 
Ari Berman, “Hillary Clinton on Trump’s Election: ‘There Are Lots of Questions about Its 




Associated Press, “Poll Finds Most Young Americans See Trump as Illegitimate President,” 
NBC News, March 17, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/majority-young-
americans-view-trump-illegitimate-president-poll-n735426. 
 
Austin, Curtis J., Up Against the Wall: Violence In the Making and Unmaking of the Black 
Panther Party. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2006.  
 




Bearden, David M., et al. “Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by 
the Environmental Protection Agency.” Journal of Current Issues in Crime, Law & Law 
Enforcement, vol. 4, no. 1/2, Apr. 2011, pp. 51–171. EBSCOhost, 
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=i3h&AN=67159692&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. Page 165 
 
Bethany Blankley Square The Center, “61% of US Counties Now ‘Second Amendment 
Sanctuaries,’” KTBS, July 5, 2021, https://www.ktbs.com/news/louisiana/61-of-us-counties-
now-second-amendment-sanctuaries/article_614f39b6-843d-513e-aff2-73689b85b02b.html. 
 
Biernatzki, William E. “Terrorism and Mass Media.” Communications Research Trends, 
Volume 21 (2002). Center For the Study of Communication and Culture. Los Gatos, CA.  
 




Blumm Michael C., and Olivier Jamin. “The Property Clause and Its Discontents: Lessons from 
the Malheur Occupation.” Ecology Law Quarterly 43 (2016)(4): 781-826. 
doi:10.15779/Z38W66977S. 
 
Brooks, Karl Boyd. Before Earth Day : the Origins of American Environmental Law, 1945-1970. 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009.  
 
Bungenberg Marc., and Stephan Hobe. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, 2015. 
Burrough, Bryan, Days of Rage: America's Radical Underground, the FBI, and the Forgotten 
Age of Revolutionary Violence. New York: Penguin Press, 2015. 
 
Buttel, Frederick H. “Some Observations on the Anti-Globalization Movement.” Australian 
Journal of Social Issues (Australian Council of Social Services) 38 (1)(2003): 95-116 
doi:10.1002/j.1839-4655.2003.tb01138.x. 
Camara, Odilon. 2020. “Trump Will Soon Be out of Office - but Polarization Isn’t Going 




Cawley, R. McGreggor. Federal Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and 
Environmental Politics. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works : the Strategic Logic of 





Cheryl Clark, “Insults, Threats of Violence Still Imperil Public Health Leaders,” 
www.medpagetoday.com, February 25, 2021, https://www.medpagetoday.com/special-
reports/exclusives/91357. 
 
Clarence Thomas, “SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES” (, June 28, 2021), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-645_9p6b.pdf. 
 
Clark, Cristy, and John Page. 2019. “Of Protest, the Commons, and Customary Public Rights.” 
University of New South Wales Law Journal. 42 (1): 26-59 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=135542427&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Colby Itkowitz, “Hillary Clinton Says Donald Trump ‘Knows He’s an Illegitimate President,’” 








Daniel Cox, “After the Ballots Are Counted: Conspiracies, Political Violence, and American 




David Luchs, “Average Margin of Victory in U.S. House Races Reaches Decade-Long Low – 




David N. Cicilline, “Text - H.Res.24 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Impeaching Donald John 
Trump, President of the United States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors.,” 
www.congress.gov, March 4, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-
resolution/24/text. 
 





Deskins, John. “The Economic Impact of Coal in West Virginia”. Bureau of Business and 





Detrow, Scott. “Trump Wants To Make Energy Production Great Again – Even As It Sets 
Records.”, National Public Radio, May 5, 2016. 
https://www.npr.org/2016/05/27/479660989/trump-wants-to-make-energy-production-great-
again-even-as-it-sets-new-records 
Diana Daly, “An Ethnographer Tries to Understand the Anti-Lockdown Protests Erupting across 
the US,” Scroll.in, May 6, 2020, https://scroll.in/article/961017/an-ethnographer-tries-to-
understand-the-anti-lockdown-protests-erupting-across-the-us 
 
Dierks, Annelieke. "Between Threat and Reality: The National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People and the Emergence of Armed Self-Defense in Clarksdale and Natchez, 
Mississippi, 1960-1965." Journal for the Study of Radicalism 1, no. 1 (2007): 71-98. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41887564. 
 
Drew DeSilver, “For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades,” Pew 
Research Center (Pew Research Center, August 7, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/. 
 
Drutman, Lee. 2016. “American Politics Has Reached Peak Polarization.” Vox. Vox. March 24, 
2016. https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/3/24/11298808/american-politics-peak-polarization. 
 
Dryzek, John S., Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism In the United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
 
Dyer, Joel. 1998. Harvest of Rage : Why Oklahama City Is Only the Beginning. Boulder, Colo. 
Oxford: Westview.  
Editors, History com. 2009. “Bomb Explodes in Capitol Building.” HISTORY. November 16, 
2009. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/bomb-explodes-in-capitol-building. 
 
Eisenberg, Ann M. “Do Sagebrush Rebels Have A Colorable Claim? The Space Between 
Parochialism and Exclusion In Federal Lands Management.” Public Land & Resources Law 
Review. (2017) (38):57-102 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=128192995&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
Eric Westervelt, “Off-Duty Police Officers Investigated, Charged with Participating in Capitol 
Riot,” NPR.org, January 15, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/01/15/956896923/police-officers-
across-nation-face-federal-charges-for-involvement-in-capitol-ri. 
 
Fernández-García Belen, and Oscar G. Luengo. “Populist Parties in Western Europe: An 
Analysis of the Three Core Elements of Populism.” Communication & Society 31 (2018) (3):57-
76 doi:10.15581/003.31.3.57-76. 
Fitzgerald, Michael W. “Terrorism and Racial Coexistence in Alabama’s Reconstruction.” 





Flournoy, Craig. “The Fair Housing Act: Enacted despite the Mainstream Media, Neutered by 
the Federal Government’s Unwillingness to Enforce It.” Cardozo Law Review, vol. 40, no. 3, 




Forchtner, Bernhard. The Far Right and the Environment: Politics, Discourse and 
Communication. Milton: Routledge, 2019. 
Gamson, William A. 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Pub.  
 
Garay, Ronald. U.S. Steel and Gary, West Virginia: Corporate Paternalism In 
Appalachia. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2011. 
Gatchet, Amanda Davis, and Dana L. Cloud. “David, Goliath, and the Black Panthers: The 
Paradox of the Oppressed Militant in the Rhetoric of Self-Defense.” Journal of Communication 
Inquiry 37, no. 1 (January 2013): 5–25. doi:10.1177/0196859912466411. 
 
George Pierson and Beverly Waters, “A Yale Book of Numbers,” Yale.Edu (New Haven, CT: 
Yale Office of Institutional Research, August 2001), 
https://oir.yale.edu/sites/default/files/pierson_update_1976-2000.pdf.  
 
Gonzalez-Arreaza, Alejandro. “Natural Resource Sovereignty and Economic Development in the 
WTO in Light of the Recent Case law Involving Raw Materials and Rare Earths.” Review of 
European Comparative & International Environmental Law. 26 (2017) (3):266-275 
doi:10.1111/reel.12209. 
Green, James R., The Devil Is Here In These Hills: West Virginia's Coal Miners and Their Battle 
for Freedom. First edition. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2015. 
Green, Judith A. “Forest Laws in England and Normandy in the Twelfth Century.” Historical 
Research 86 (2013) (233):416-431doi:10.1111/1468-2281.12003. 
Green, Ruth. “The Rise and Rise of National Populism: A Global Resurgence of Populism and 
Nationalism Has Galvanised Support for Leaders with Policies Inimical to the Rule of Law. 
Global Insight Assesses the Risks and How They Can Be Countered.” IBA Global Insight 73 
(2019)(5): 12-17 
 
Gribben, Crawford. 2002. “‘Passionate Desires, and Confident Hopes’: Puritan Millenarianism 
and Anglo-Scottish Union, 1560-1644.” Reformation & Renaissance Review 4 (2): 241–58. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=rfh&AN=ATLA000
1525471&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
Haines, Herbert H. “Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970.” Social 





Hanser, Robert D. “Psychological Warfare and Terrorism”. No date. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.519.6163 Retrieved 20Nov19 
Harlan-Haughey, Sarah . “Forest Law Through The Looking Glass: Distortions of the Forest 
Charter In the Outlaw Fiction of Late Medieval England.” William & Mary Bill of Rights 
Journal. Volume 25, Issue 2, (December 2016) 
Hill, Rickey. “The Bogalusa Movement: Self-Defense and Black Power in the Civil Rights 
Struggle.” Black Scholar 41, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 43–54. doi:10.5816/blackscholar.41.3.0043.  
History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, “1954 Shooting in the House 
Chamber,” https://history.house.gov/OralHistory/Detail?id=37761 (February 27, 2021) 
Hopkin, J., & Blyth, M. “The global economics of european populism: Growth regimes and 
party system change in Europe “(the government and opposition /leonard schapiro lecture 
2017). Government & Opposition, 54 (2019) (2), 193. doi:10.1017/gov.2018.43 
Horváth, Peter, and Ján Machyniak. 2016. “Media Impact on Public Policy Making.” Marketing 




Houck, Oliver A. “Judicial Review Under the Fish and Wildlife Act: A Plaintiffs Guide to 
litigation.” Environmental Law Review. 1981. Retrieved from: 




Jacob Bower-Bir, “RPubs - US Cabinet Pedigree and Perceptions of University Elite Status,” 
rpubs.com, May 2, 2021, https://rpubs.com/jbowerbir/cabinetPedigree. 
 




James Macdonald, Robert Hoppe, and Doris Newton, “Three Decades of Consolidation in U.S. 
Agriculture” (, 2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/88057/eib-189.pdf. 
 
James McGovern, “PROVIDING for CONSIDERATION of the RESOLUTION (H. RES. 24) 
IMPEACHING DONALD JOHN TRUMP, PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES, for HIGH 
CRIMES and MISDEMEANORS.” (2021). 
 
Jeff Daniels, “The ‘Calexit’ Plan to Split California from the US Gets a Second Chance, While 
Others Are Looking to Break up the State,” CNBC (CNBC, April 24, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/24/calexit-plan-to-divorce-california-from-us-is-getting-a-
second-chance.html. 
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries et al., “A Small Group of Militants’ Outsize Role in the Capitol 






John Schmidt, Elise Gould, and Josh Bivens, “America’s Slow-Motion Wage Crisis: Four 










Josh Salman, “Capitol Riot: What We Know about Allegations of inside Help from Members of 




Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror In the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. 3rd 
ed., rev. and updated. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Jurasinski, S. Neophilologus. “The Rime of King William and It’s Analogues.” Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.  (2004) 88: 131. https://doi-
org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/10.1023/B:NEOP.0000003818.88235.27 
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